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An Ancient Version of the 
Problem of Public Goods1
by Kristen Hawkes
People who hunt and gather for a living share some resources 
more widely than others. A favored hypothesis to explain the dif­
ferential sharing is that giving up portions of large, unpredictable 
resources obligates others to return shares of them later, reduc­
ing everyone's variance in consumption. I show that this insur­
ance argument is not empirically supported for !Kung, Ache, and 
Hadza foragers. An alternative hypothesis is that the cost of not 
sharing these resources is too high to pay. If exclusion costs are 
high, then these resources are like public goods. If so, why does 
anyone provide them? I briefly review treatments of the problem 
of public goods by economists and use a simple model to show 
why self-interested actors will rarely find the consumption value 
they place on collective goods sufficient reason to supply them. 
The model underlines the obvious corollary that individuals get 
more to consume if others provide collective goods. This is a rea­
son to prefer neighbors and associates who are suppliers. Such a 
preference may itself be a benefit worth seeking. I construct an­
other simple model to explore this. Taken together the models 
suggest two competing foraging goals: feeding one's family and 
gaining social benefits instead. This highlights conflicts of eco­
nomic interest among family members. It is a direct challenge to 
influential scenarios of human evolution built on the assumption 
that men are primarily paternal investors who hunt to support 
their spouses and offspring.
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Many anthropological questions turn  on the assumption 
that hunter-gatherers work prim arily to m eet family 
needs. This assum ption is used to contrast hum ans and 
other prim ates (Lancaster and Lancaster 19 8 3 ), to de­
velop hypotheses about the design of our cognitive and 
social propensities (Tooby and DeVore 19 8 7 , Cosmides 
and Tooby 19 9 2 ), to construct scenarios of hom inid evo­
lution throughout the Plio/Pleistocene (Isaac 19 78 , Lea­
key and Lewin T992), and to guide inquiry into the ori­
gins of agriculture (Cohen 19 7 7 ). Anthropologists 
adopting m any theoretical perspectives (e.g., Harris 
1989 , Sahlins 19 7 2 , Smith 19 8 3 ) assum e that foragers 
work to feed them selves and their families and that 
marked paternal investm ent is the key to a wide array 
of distinctive hum an patterns (Washburn and Lancaster 
1968 , Lovejoy 1 9 8 1 , Alexander 19 9 0 ). I argue here that 
goals that compete w ith  family provisioning shape the 
foraging strategies of contemporary people who depend 
directly on wild foods. Since these goals arise from op­
portunities and constraints imposed on subsistence for­
agers by the characteristics of wild resources, they 
would have played an im portant role in the ancestral 
past.
For some categories of foods, notably medium-sized 
and large game, there is little  if any relationship between 
the am ounts foragers acquire themselves and the 
am ounts they and their families consume. This raises 
two questions. First, why don't they keep w hat they ac­
quire? The proposition that foragers share to reduce the 
risks posed by exploiting unpredictable resources is 
widely favored but lacks empirical support. This gives 
the second question more force: Why do foragers ever 
target resources tha t will go m ostly to others rather than 
to their spouses and children?
Widely shared resources are like public goods: they 
can be consumed by those who do not pay the acquisi­
tion costs. Economists have long noted that self­
interested individuals will rarely contribute their fair 
share of the cost of any public good voluntarily (Sam- 
uelson 19 5 4 ). This is the problem so influentially ex­
posed by Hardin (19 6 8 ) as " the tragedy of the com ­
m ons." It is the logic of collective action (Olson 19 6 5 ). 
A public good will be undersupplied by self-interested 
actors w ithout some incentive distinct from the con­
sum ption value of the good itself.
If, as is argued below, unpredictably acquired large- 
package foods are public goods, then  the supply of these 
foods poses a collective action problem at least as old 
as hunting or com petitively scavenging large animals. 
Archaeological and ethnographic evidence shows that 
such goods have long been supplied in hum an foraging 
com m unities. An inquiry into the incentives for provid­
ing them  should contribute to an understanding of other 
social patterns in  both the present and the past.
I elaborate the hypothesis tha t the incentive for pro­
viding widely shared goods is favorable attention from 
other group members. If those who provide public goods 
are listened to and watched more closely than others and 
favored as neighbors and associates, they have a larger, 
readier pool of potential allies and mates. When this is
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so, foragers face a trade-off between increasing their fam­
ilies' food consum ption and increasing the attention 
they get from other members of their group. Public 
goods will be provided when, for some individuals, the 
fitness value of the latter outweighs that of the former. 
This solution to the public-goods problem relies on iden­
tifying a fitness benefit that depends directly on the con­
sum ption value of the public good but is distinct from 
it.
An obvious gender difference is consistent w ith this 
argument. Under some circumstances foraging m en may 
gain more fitness, as measured (say) in  grandchildren, 
by seeking social attention because of the support and 
mating advantages they can use it to elicit. Women may 
more often leave greater numbers of grandchildren by 
foregoing this social attention and foraging for family 
consumption instead. From this perspective hunting or 
competitively scavenging large animals is more often 
done by m en because they more often gain from pursu­
ing goals alternative to family provisioning.
After a brief discussion of evolutionary ecology, which 
focuses attention on fitness-related costs and benefits to 
individuals and consequently on the conflicts of interest 
that arise among members of any social group, I review 
ethnographic data showing tha t foragers do not max­
imize the benefits they and their families receive in food 
consumption by targeting widely shared foods. The pat­
tern is a challenge to long-standing views about nuclear 
families as basic units of production in hum an societies 
and to the associated notion that m en hunt to feed their 
offspring. The data show wide and predictable variation 
in sharing of the resources that foragers exploit. Simpli­
fying this variation in  term s of two polar resource types 
("private" vs. "collective" goods) and modeling the logic 
of collective action shows that foragers will usually 
maximize their own family consumption by targeting 
private goods. O ther benefits—aside from consumption 
of the goods them selves—will be necessary to induce 
self-interested foragers to supply collective goods. A sec­
ond model indicates how such "selective incentives" 
(Olson 19 6 5 ) give that result. Taken together the models 
show that if foragers seek consum ption benefits, they 
will target private goods; if they seek social benefits, 
they will target collective goods. By exploring how the 
values of these different kinds of benefits vary w ith for­
agers' age and sex and w ith  local resource opportunities, 
we may explain variation in the kinds and amounts of 
work foragers do. The supply of other collective goods 
may depend on sim ilar trade-offs.
Optimality
Evolutionary ecology poses problems in economic terms 
(Maynard Smith 1978 , Parker and Maynard Smith 19 9 0 ). 
Investigators cast questions about all aspects of individ­
ual organisms—developmental, morphological, physio­
logical, behavioral—as allocation "decisions." In a 
world of lim ited tim e and materials, more of one thing 
means less of something else. N atural selection war­
rants the assum ption that organisms are designed to 
make allocation decisions tha t generally serve their own 
fitness. Every allocation has a cost, the missed benefits 
of alternatives foregone. Paradoxically, perfect alloca­
tions are unlikely because the benefits of improvements 
may not outweigh their costs, hence the optimizer's epi­
gram: "N othing w orth doing is worth doing perfectly." 
Alternatives that generally give higher net fitness bene­
fits are nonetheless expected to predominate. This justi­
fies the proposition that hum an evolution has shaped 
people to assess and then adjust to a wide array of cir­
cumstances according to cues that have been generally 
associated w ith  their own fitness. No expectation that 
behavioral differences are due to genetic differences is 
required. Selection can result in tendencies to make fit­
ness-enhancing adjustments to circumstances that pro­
duce wide phenotypic differences in  a genetically hom o­
geneous population. These assumptions provide the 
basis for asking questions about any aspect of human 
behavior (Smith and W interhalder 19 9 2 ), including ques­
tions about the am ount or kind of work people learn to 
do.
Since there is always the opportunity cost of gains 
foregone from alternative activities, the optimal amount 
and kind of work w ill change w ith  the array of possibili­
ties. Trade-offs will differ w ith circumstances. Any work 
decision may involve m any trade-offs, not only activi­
ties foregone but the profitability of different kinds of 
work, differences in  the efficiency of "tim e-sharing" var­
ious other activities w ith  different kinds of work, differ­
ences in payoffs if different kinds of work can be more 
efficiently done in different places or at different times, 
differences in the values of the products acquired, differ­
ences in the control workers have over the product, and 
differences in the way the products of work affect the 
behavior of others. The im portant question is whether 
there are a few (ideally measurable) costs and benefits 
that capture enough of the fitness trade-offs to account 
for a significant part of the variation (both synchronic 
and diachronic) that we hope to explain.
The cost of foraging is the benefits missed from alter­
native activities. The cost of choosing a resource is the 
gain foregone from others not sought instead. Widely 
used optimal foraging models (Stephens and Krebs 1986 , 
Smith 1983 , Kaplan and Hill r 992) focus on the trade-off 
between the mean acquisition rate (often measured as 
expected calories per un it time) gained from stopping to 
handle one resource and the expected rate from continu­
ing to search for something better or between the mean 
acquisition rate gained from continuing to exploit one 
resource patch and the expected rate from traveling to 
and searching another. Alternatives are usually evalu­
ated along one dimension of variation: the mean nu tri­
tional acquisition rates expected from particular re­
sources or resource patches. The usual justification for 
focusing on acquisition rates is that they are correlated 
w ith foragers' consumption. For hum an foragers this 
hides a wide range of variation. Resources vary greatly 
in how m uch acquirers can expect to keep for their own 
or their families' consum ption (Kaplan 19 8 3 , Kaplan and
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Hill 19 8 5 a). For som e resources, foragers' acquisition 
rates are closely related to their own or their fam ilies' 
consum ption rates; for others, they are not. If foragers 
m axim ize fam ily consum ption and expect to keep differ­
en t fractions of different resources, then  the am ounts 
they are likely to  keep, n o t the am ounts appropriated by 
others, should govern their choice of resources.
The Difference between Acquisition and 
Consumption
D ata from three ethnographic cases show tha t som e re­
sources are so w idely shared th a t the consum ption pay­
off a forager can expect from acquiring them  is lower 
than if he had taken others instead.
The !Kung of northw estern  Botswana and adjacent 
parts of N am ibia are the best-know n hunter-gatherers 
in the world (Lee and DeVore 19 7 6 ). Though the effects 
of colonial history in  th is area have recently been hotly  
debated (Solway and Lee 1990 , W ilm sen and Denbow 
19 9 0 ), in  the 19 6 0 s, w hen key quantitative observations 
were undertaken, m ost depended on foraging for their 
daily subsistence (Lee 1 9 7 9 ). They took a diverse array 
of plant and anim al resources, notably mongongo nuts 
but also various tubers, berries, baobab, tsin  beans, and 
m am m als ranging in  size from sm all spring hares to 
giraffes. W omen custom arily exploited the plant foods. 
M arshall's (19 5 6 ) film  and Lee's descriptions have pro­
vided a lasting image of m en stalking big game w ith  
sm all bows and poisoned arrows, bu t m en also set snares 
for sm aller prey and collected p lant foods. Lee em pha­
sized the sharing in  !Kung camps bu t noted th a t vegeta­
ble foods tended to  stay at the fire of the  collector and, 
by contrast, cited Loma M arshall's report tha t large ani­
m als were treated differently. W hereas sm all anim als 
and plant foods were shared only w ith  one's "im m ediate 
family or w ith  others as he or she chooses," large an i­
mals were shared by all (Marshall 1 9 7 6 :3 5 7 ).
During a four-week period of the dry season in  1964 , 
m ost of the game taken was sm all anim als captured 
w ith  snares. The only large prey were four warthogs, all 
killed by one hun ter "w ith  his excellent dogs" (p. 2 6 5 ). 
These represented 7 5 % of the  game by weight during 
the observation period. T he hun ter responsible spent 16  
days hunting for estim ated earnings of 28,200  Cal/day 
(p. 268).2 Six o ther m en who hunted killed only sm all
2. This is a notably high rate. Lee elsewhere 11979:242) estimates 
that hunters average two or three large animals a year and then says 
that even this may be "on the high side" (p. 243], citing Wilmsen's 
estimate of 0.6 large animal per man per year at /Xai/xai. If the 1 1  
men monitored during Lee's period of observation had acquired his 
estimated 2.5 large animals per year each, the long-term average 
for the camp would have been 2.3/month. Counting only the 7 
men who did any hunting during that period, the expected rate for 
the camp would still have been 1.4/month. Just one such catch 
could have more than doubled the meat consumed during July 
1964. The failure of any hunter to kill a large antelope with poi­
soned arrows that month as well as ^Tom a's remarkable success 
with his dogs indicate the huge short-term variation characteristic 
of big-game hunting (noted by Lee 1979:243).
animals, earning an average of 2 ,7 19  C al/day each. M en 
provided 1 9 % of the  vegetable food during th is period, 
earning 12 ,000  C al/day of gathering (p. 2 6 2 ). Combined 
w ith  the observations on sharing patterns, these data 
show the fam ily consum ption rates th a t foragers can ex­
pect from different resources. If the m eat of large an i­
m als were shared by all in  a camp, the big-game hun ter's  
consum ption fraction w ould vary w ith  the num ber of 
camp residents. Lee reported 25 adult residents in  the 
camp he m onitored, including 1 1  m en. If each of these 
m en represented a family, a hun ter who acquired 28,200 
Cal/day from large anim als m ight have expected to keep 
1 / 1 1  for his fam ily 's share, 2 ,564  Cal/day. By setting 
snares and targeting sm all game to keep at his own 
hearth he would have done slightly better, 2 ,7 19  C al/ 
day, and by collecting p lant foods instead he w ould have 
done m uch better, 12 ,0 00  Cal/day. Even counting the 
heavy processing required by som e p lant resources 
(Hawkes and O 'C onnell 1 9 8 1 , 19 8 5 ) returns w ould still 
have been high: one to  tw o days spent processing would 
still have m eant 4,000—6,000 C al/day for gathered foods, 
nearly tw ice the am ount of consum ption earned from 
hunting. U nder these circum stances, a m an who chose 
to hu n t large anim als contributed m ore to others (in this 
case an order of m agnitude m ore than  he kept, 25,640 
Cal/day) and less to h im se lf and his own fa m ily  than 
when he gathered or hunted  and snared sm all game.
The Ache of eastern Paraguay (Hill 19 8 3 ) inhabit the 
well-watered forest just south  of the Amazon basin. 
During the 19 7 0 s all began to spend at least part of their 
tim e in  agricultural settlem ents (Hawkes et al. 19 8 7 ), 
devoting substantial am ounts of tim e to foraging trips 
away from these bases through the early 19 8 0s. Partici­
pation in  a sam ple of these foraging trips has allowed us 
to accum ulate a quantitative record of foraging strate­
gies, tim e allocation, and food sharing (Hawkes, Hill, 
and O 'C onnell 19 8 2 ,- H ill and Hawkes 19 8 3 ; H ill et al. 
1984 , 19 8 5 , 19 8 7 ; Kaplan et al. 19 8 4 ; H urtado et al. 
19 8 5 ; Kaplan and H ill 19 8 5 a). Ache foragers exploit the 
starch, fruit, and "heart"  of a palm  ubiquitous in  their 
forest, as well as an  array of seasonal fruits. Insects pro­
vide several kinds of honey and larvae. M any species of 
vertebrates are hunted, som e w ith  bows and arrows and 
some w ith  sticks or by hand. Com m on prey range in  
size from capuchin m onkeys to white-lipped peccaries 
and occasionally tapirs.
As w ith  the !Kung, acquisition and consum ption rates 
are m ore closely related for som e resources than  for o th ­
ers. A m an acquires about 1 ,34 0  C al/hr. (Hill e t al. 19 8 7 ) 
targeting largely m eat and honey. A bout 1 3 % of th a t is 
consum ed by his own fam ily (Kaplan 19 8 3 , Kaplan and 
Hill 19 8 5 a). M en also gather all the resources wom en 
do, but because w om en do no t h u n t their acquisition 
rates suggest the rates m en m ight earn if they  focused 
on gathering. W omen earn from 1 ,2 2 0  to  2,800  C al/hr., 
depending on w hether their travel is counted as foraging 
tim e (Hill e t al. 1 9 8 7 ). Of th is 4 7 .5 % is consum ed by 
their own families (Kaplan 19 8 3 , Kaplan and H ill 19 8 5 a). 
The differences in  sharing depend on the resources 
themselves. Food types show the sam e distinctive shar­
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ing patterns whether they are acquired by m en or 
women, and m en preferentially target the ones that are 
more widely shared (Hawkes 1 9 9 1 ). The expected contri­
bution to the foragers' own families' consum ption is 174  
Cal/hr. (that is, 1 3 % of the acquisition rate) for targeting 
game and honey and 580 to 1 ,33 0  Cal/hr. (4 7 .5% of the 
acquisition rate) for targeting plant foods and larvae. 
Men get less for their own families by taking game and 
honey than they would by gathering plant foods and lar­
vae instead.
The Hadza live in  the wooded savannah south and 
east of Lake Eyasi, northern Tanzania (Woodburn 1968 , 
Blurton Jones et al. 19 9 2 ). In the past few decades they 
have been m uch less isolated than the Dobe !Kung or 
the Ache before the 19 70 s. In spite of the proximity of 
neighbors and repeated governmental and missionary at­
tempts to settle them, many have continued to depend 
on hunting and gathering. Some have avoided settle­
ments altogether, and m any people have repeatedly re­
turned to full-time foraging (Woodburn 1988 , Blurton 
[ones et al. 19 9 2 ). Since the m id-1980s, quantitative data 
have been collected on an array of topics including forag­
ing strategies and tim e allocation (e.g., O'Connell, 
Hawkes, and Blurton Jones 1988 ; Blurton Jones, 
Hawkes, and O 'Connell 1989 ; Hawkes, O 'Connell, and 
Blurton Jones 1989 , 1 9 9 1 ). Local resources are similar to 
those available to the IKung but more abundant. Hadza 
women collect tubers, berries, baobab, and tam arind and 
cooperate seasonally w ith  m en in pursuit of honey. Un­
like the !Kung, Hadza m en are also specialized big-game 
hunters, taking prey ranging in  size from impala to gi­
raffe w ith bows and metal-tipped poisoned arrows to 
earn an average of 4.9 kg/day (Hawkes, O 'Connell, and 
Blurton Jones 1 9 9 1 ). Although the technology is known 
to them, they make little  use of snares or traps and gen­
erally pass by the small animals frequently seen in this 
environment.
The m eat of large animals is very widely shared not 
only in the hunter's own camp but w ith other camps as 
well. Assuming conservatively that a camp defines the 
sharing lim its and that each hunter represents a family, 
then the mean of about eight m en in a Hadza camp 
leaves the hunter w ith an average 1/8 of his acquisition 
or about 900 Cal/day. Tubers and berries are not so 
widely shared. Women earn averages of about 4.5 kg/day 
from these resources (Hawkes, O 'Connell, and Blurton 
Jones 1989) or about 3,900 and 10 ,000  Cal/day respec­
tively .3 If collected resources are consumed by the fam­
ily of the gatherer, then as w ith the preceding cases men 
earn substantially less for themselves and their families 
to consume when they hunt than if they had gathered.
The Hadza data illustrate a related dimension of con­
trast along which resources vary: predictability. For a 
Hadza hunter, the probability of killing or scavenging a
3. The daily rates come from observations during September and 
October 1985 and March and April 1986. Caloric values for the 
main species of tuber, Vigna frutescens, are 85 Cal/100 g, for the
species of berry tabulated in Hawkes, O'Connell, and Blurton Jones 
(1989), Grewia bicolor, 223 Cal/100 g (Galvin et al. n.d.].
large animal on any given day is —0 .03 , meaning that 
he faces a 0.97 risk of failure each day (Hawkes, O 'Con­
nell, and Blurton Jones 1991) .4 This m akes hunting and 
scavenging large animals an especially poor choice of 
foraging strategies if the goal is to m eet daily family 
consumption needs. Moreover, when a hunter does hit, 
most of his kill goes to those outside his family. By con­
trast, small-game hunting and trapping fail far less often, 
gathering never, and in each case most if not all of the 
product goes to the forager's own family.
These three cases illustrate a general pattern among 
hunter-gatherers: some resources are m uch more widely 
shared than others. In taking the widely shared foods, 
foragers contribute m ost of w hat they acquire to others 
in the community. Kaplan (19 8 3 ; Kaplan and Hill 19 85a) 
has demonstrated that for the Ache there is a correlation 
between sharing outside the nuclear family of the ac­
quirer and two resource characteristics: predictability 
and package size. The relationship holds at least qualita­
tively for the IKung and the Hadza as well.
Explaining Sharing: The Reciprocity 
Hypothesis
Why are unpredictable large-package resources so 
widely shared? A favorite hypothesis is that the fraction 
given up to others is repaid in  future by the shares they 
return. This variance-reduction (Kaplan 19 8 3 , Kaplan 
and Hill 198512, W interhalder 1986 ), insurance (Cashdan 
19 8 5 ), or reciprocal-altruism (Trivers 1 9 7 1 1 hypothesis 
proposes that individuals exchange short-term  surplus 
to increase their own consum ption payoff over time.
The resources m ost widely shared are the riskiest to 
pursue, those showing high variance in acquisition. 
Daily averaging does reduce consumption variance. The 
pattern has long been noted by anthropologists (e.g., Sah- 
lins 19 7 2 , Gould 19 8 2 ) and treated more formally by 
those drawing on behavioral ecology (Cashdan 1985 , 
W interhalder 1986 , Smith 1988 , Smith and Boyd 1990 ). 
If the first units of a large resource are worth more than 
additional units, then sharing not only reduces the vari­
ance but also raises the average consumption payoff for 
the sharers (Kaplan 19 8 3 , Kaplan and Hill 19 8 5a).
Assuming a group of ten  members, the gain curve for 
consuming additional units of a resource for any m em ­
ber takes the shape indicated in figure 1 . If the resource 
is unpredictably acquired, then successes are uncorre­
lated. When one forager is successful and all ten group 
members consume one unit each from the lucky for­
ager's score, then, since the payoff for the first un it is 
one consum ption payoff point and each consumer's unit 
is that person's first, the total group payoff is ten. If, in
4. This is measured over 256 days of observation covering all sea­
sons 1985-89, 2,072 hunter-days. It is a very low rate but substan­
tially higher than the long-term big-game rate Lee estimates for 
the !Kung (2-3 animals/year). The difference in success rates can 
be related to differences in the work strategies men adopt (Hawkes 
1990).
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F i g . 1 .  The x-axis represents the am ount o f a large, asynchronously acquired, divisible good. The y -axis 
represents the payoff to any ind ividua l for consum ing portions of the good. The first un it consum ed provides 
one payoff point; additional units are increasingly less valuable. A  portion is worth less as the second unit 
consum ed by one ind iv idua l than i t  w ould  be as the first portion consum ed by another.
contrast, only one m em ber consum es it all, th a t m em ber 
gets one point for the first u n it bu t less for each addi­
tional unit, resulting in  a to tal consum ption payoff of 
only two. Clearly the  group does better if the good is 
shared. But does th a t m ean tha t individuals increase 
their own consum ption by sharing?
For the values assum ed here, the n ine units of the 
good tha t others take are w orth a to tal of only one con­
sum ption payoff point to the acquirer, once he has his 
first unit. If in  return  for giving up those nine units he 
obligates the others to pay h im  back w hen they are 
lucky and he is not, he w ill gain by sharing. This is 
the insurance or risk-reduction argument: one gives up 
som ething today in  order to  receive som ething of greater 
value in  future. It m ust be the case, then, tha t those 
who do not give shares do n o t get them .
The em pirical picture does not show th a t one m ust 
give to receive. In Lee's record of the !Kung, some forag­
ers provided m uch m ore than  others. One m an acquired 
—78% of the m eat for the entire camp for a m onth. Of 
the other men, four did no hunting at all, bu t there is 
no indication th a t they were excluded. M arshall's char­
acterization of m eat sharing and Lee's endorsem ent indi­
cate tha t shares go to all.
In the case of the Ache, Kaplan and H ill (19 8 5 a) report 
up to sixfold differences in  the am ounts of food acquired 
by families over periods less than  tw o weeks. Individual 
m en rank consistently  from one year to the next in  both 
their success rates and their acquisition totals. Those 
who acquire at a higher rate also spend m ore tim e h u n t­
ing, increasing their disproportionate contribution to 
group consum ption (Hill and Hawkes 19 8 3 ). Yet there 
is no relationship betw een the am ount a hun ter acquires 
and the am ount his fam ily consum es (Kaplan and Hill 
19 8 5 a).
Acquisition rates vary even m ore widely among 
Hadza hunters. For 1 4  men, each observed for 20  days 
or more in  19 8 5 - 86, the range in daily acquisition rates 
is from o to about 1 anim al a week, from o to 27.25  kg/ 
day. The m eans are 0.046  ± 0.05 anim als/day and 5.41 
± 7.58 kg/day. There is no comparable, let alone corre­
lated, variance in  consum ption. Over a sample of 13 0  
observation days, 52 % of the m eat in  study camps was 
procured by tw o m en, one present for 69 days, the other 
for 5 1 . The m eat any hun ter acquired was eaten by all, 
including women, children, and m en who never contrib­
uted any m eat. People got shares w hether or not they 
had been providing them .
In none of these cases is there evidence of repaym ent 
in  kind to the providers. Two aspects of these patterns 
m erit further com m ent: the duration of observations 
and the focus on repaym ent in  kind. The absence of re­
paym ent is shown over lim ited tim e periods. Lee's work 
diaries covered a m onth. The data used on individual 
Hadza hunters cover only 1 3 0  days. The longest tim e 
period in the Ache data is the com parison of hunters ' 
rankings betw een tw o periods w ith in  two years. The hy ­
pothesis th a t delays m ay be longer than  those captured 
ethnographically cannot be falsified. Longer tim e frames 
m ight show repaym ent. Three considerations are rele­
vant to this hypothesis. First, w hen Axelrod (19 8 4 ; Axel­
rod and H am ilton 1 9 8 1 ) used com puter tournam ents to 
investigate the success of strategies of cooperation in 
two-player sequences, he found tha t strategies in w hich 
a player's move was contingent only on the opponent's 
last play out-com peted rivals w ith  longer "m em ories." 
Those who quickly forgot the past were m ore successful 
because they avoided the  costly sequences of reprisals 
that befell those who held grudges. Second, a consider­
ation also em phasized by Axelrod, long delays between
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a benefit given and one returned m ake reciprocity diffi­
cult to sustain because of the sharp increases in dis­
counting of future benefits w ith  increasing delay. Empir­
ical evidence of the high rate at which people discount 
the value of future benefits [e.g., Logue 1988} is consis­
tent w ith this general point. Third, the hypothesis that 
benefits are returned after delays of longer duration 
leaves continuing contributions from those who have 
not been repaid unexplained. If foragers gave up shares 
to ensure repayment, then no one would have reason to 
continue to give to those already in his debt.
Repayment in  kind is the test of the variance- 
reduction hypothesis because sharing is proposed to be 
the hedge against probable failure to capture unpredict- 
ably acquired resources. If, as others have suggested (e.g., 
Kaplan and Hill 19 8 5a, W interhalder 1986 ), those who 
provide shares are compensated in some other form, the 
advantage to the share givers is not reduced variance in 
their consum ption of the risky resource. Improvements 
for the "average group m ember" can hide differences in 
costs and benefits for different members. All may do 
better if they all share than if none do, but some may 
do better not to share if others do.
Sharing as "Tolerated Theft7'
If what ethnologists label "reciprocity" is rarely literally 
reciprocal (Sahlins 19 6 5 ) the question remains: if one 
need not give to receive, why give? Building on Maynard 
Smith and Parker's work on contests over resources, 
Blurton Jones (1984 , 19 8 7 ) has suggested a model of "to l­
erated theft." He points out that if resources are large 
and asynchronously acquired, then one forager's suc­
cessful capture will be of potential consumption value 
to many. If the acquirer tries to consume it all, the con­
sumption payoff gained from each additional un it con­
sumed will be less than the consum ption payoff hungry 
others would get from those same units (as in figure 1 ). 
If individuals can afford to invest more in  a contest 
when they have more to gain from winning, those who 
have consumed less can afford to fight harder. If ac­
quirers cannot afford to fight as hard for additional por­
tions, they will do better not to contest the claims of 
others at all. The resources are "shared" because the 
cost to an acquirer of not sharing is too high.
Kaplan and Hill (19 8 5a) and Kaplan, Hill, and Hurtado 
(1990 ) have argued that if the physical contest were deci­
sive, then differences in resource-holding potential (i.e., 
differences in the cost of a fight to different individuals) 
would determine the distribution. Yet size and strength, 
which usually determine resource-holding potential in 
other animals, have no effect on the shares people get. 
In none of the ethnographic cases do the biggest and 
strongest m en take everything. Women, small children, 
old people, and even people not present at the tim e get 
shares. Some of this may still relate to physical costs. 
People may choose to avoid the rage they could antici­
pate if a strong neighbor returned to find nothing but 
the evidence of a finished meal. When a child is relieved
of a desirable share of honey in  a Hadza camp, wails of 
protest can quickly draw the child's m other and others 
as well. Blurton Jones (19 8 7 ) suggests that because peo­
ple can apply lethal force against each other, differences 
in "overkill capacity" may not m atter. Deadly weapons 
may have a long history as "equalizers." This would 
make resource-holding potential more generally similar 
among hum ans than among other primates. Are there 
other costs as well?
Ethnologists have long used contrasts in patterns of 
"exchange" to distinguish traditional kinship com m uni­
ties from those of m odem  states. Mauss (1967 [19 2 5 ]! 
noted that in archaic societies there are no neutral 
strangers; people are either friends or enemies. Friends 
give gifts; giving gifts m aintains friendly relationships. 
White (19 59 ) suggested that there are two kinds of econ­
omies, those in which the value of item s exchanged gov­
erns transfers and those in which the social relationship 
between the parties to the transfer governs. Polanyi 
(19 5 7 ) described transfers in m arketless societies as em ­
bedded in social relationships. These scholars, none di­
rectly influenced by the others, argued that in traditional 
societies the transfer of valuable item s depends on social 
relationships. To refuse or interfere w ith transfers is to 
deny the social relationships and the common interest 
they represent.
These ideas point to a cost distinct from physical in­
jury that, though elusive, could have substantial fitness 
consequences. When one person tries to exclude another 
from using something tha t is of greater value to that 
other he incites hostility and aggression or at least pas­
sive enmity. When goods come unpredictably in large 
amounts, many are drawn to the rich resource patches 
created by the acquisitions of a few. The cost of interfer­
ing w ith transfers to those w ith less could be overt con­
flict.
Recently hunter-gatherer ethnographers have charac­
terized the transfers they observe (and participate in) as 
"demand" sharing (Ingold, Riches, and Woodburn 1988 ). 
Bird-David (1990 , 19 9 2 ) notes the framing of demands in 
terms not of repayment for past generosity but of current 
inequities: "Give to me because I have none," "Give to 
me because I am needier than you," "Give to me be­
cause you have so m uch." This suggests calculation in 
terms of the costs and benefits noted by Blurton Jones 
(1984 , 19 8 7 ), who recalls the edge of hostility common 
in ethnographic accounts of sharing. The transfers he 
labels tolerated theft occur only when there are marked 
disparities in  holdings. If resources are acquired by many 
in synchrony, if everybody has coincident luck, good or 
bad, there is no basis for demanding transfers. If re­
sources come in small lumps, there will be little extra 
that one values less than another. No one's acquisition 
presents a valuable patch for others to exploit.
The label "tolerated theft" should not be taken to im ­
ply that goods belong to the acquirer. The model ad­
dresses the trade-offs individuals face in the absence of 
well-defined property rights. A good is held for con­
sumption only to the extent that the holder can exclude 
other users. Potential contestants determine the cost of
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exclusion, w hich can m ultip ly  w ith  th e  num ber of com ­
petitors. In the absence of well-defined property rights, 
the value of the things one can accum ulate depends on 
w hat everyone else has.
Public Goods and the Logic of Collective 
Action
Goods th a t are large and acquired asynchronously create 
patches of high relative value. Because the alternative 
to getting som e is having none, they have high exclusion 
costs. If the exclusion costs are high enough, the goods 
are effectively public goods; they can be consum ed by 
those who do n o t pay the  cost of acquiring them  di­
rectly, and individuals serve their own in terest by allo­
cating their foraging tim e to  o ther resources w hile con­
sum ing them  for free. Influential treatm ents of the 
public-goods problem have a history of several centuries, 
m ostly associated w ith  the origin and proper role of the 
state. Formal treatm ents begin w ith  Samuelson (19 5 4 ), 
who assum ed tw o categories of goods, "private" and 
"collective." He emphasized the distinction between 
goods tha t can be "parcelled out among two or more 
persons, w ith  one m an having a loaf less if another gets 
a loaf m ore," and those in  w hich each person can con­
sum e the whole thing—bread vs. circuses (Samuelson 
19 5 s ) . M uch discussion has ensued about the defining 
characteristics of public goods. Two are "jointness of 
supply" (as in  Sam uelson's in itial discussion, the same 
u n it can be consum ed by all) and "nonexcludability" 
(consumers cannot be excluded from the  good w hether 
or not they pay). Food is often cited as the classic illus­
tration of a private good. But if one person bakes a loaf 
of bread and the  cost of refusing a slice to another is too 
high to be w orth paying, then  the loaf is no t a perfectly 
private good. Paradoxically, certain kinds of foods pre­
sent a kind of public-goods problem  of great antiquity 
in  hum an experience, greater th an  th a t of the  com m on 
pasture used as an illustra tion  by Hardin (1968). If the 
cost of excluding others from shares of large, unpredict- 
ably acquired anim als is too high to  pay, the problem  is 
as old as the hunting or com petitive scavenging of big 
game.
In 19 6 5  Olson dem onstrated th a t the logic of collec­
tive action was extrem ely general, arising whenever 
m em bers of a group have a com m on goal. This develop­
m ent in  economics paralleled events in  evolutionary bi­
ology, w here at the same tim e W illiams (1966) was 
showing the im portance of distinguishing group and in ­
dividual interests. Economists also recognized the gen­
eral im portance of distinguishing costs and benefits ex­
ternal to the accounts of a decision m aker and the 
determ ining effects these externalities can have on so­
cial outcomes.
If some resources w ill be collective goods, the  con­
sum ption payoffs foragers can expect depend no t only on 
w hich resources they target bu t also on w hich resources 
others choose. W hen the costs and benefits for a pattern 
of behavior depend on how m any others do the same
thing, the payoffs are said to  be "frequency-dependent." 
Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Sm ith 19 8 2 , Parker 
and M aynard Sm ith 19 90) provides the analytical tools 
for identifying optim al strategies w hen payoffs are fre­
quency-dependent. Games can be sym m etric (all players 
confronting the same payoffs) or asym m etric. They can 
involve two or m ore players and tw o or m ore possible 
strategies, and the strategies them selves m ay or m ay not 
be contingent on anything about the game. The contests 
may be "one-shot gam es" or repeated sequences w ith  
w innings evaluated over a series of plays.
A very simple m odel of the consum ption trade-offs 
foragers m ight face can be m odeled as a sym m etric n- 
person game w ith  tw o alternative strategies: foragers 
can target either collective goods (those of w hich others 
will successfully dem and shares) or private goods (those 
not widely demanded by others). Because the topic here 
is food resources, the goods are divisible, and a u n it of 
the good can be used by only one consum er (in contrast, 
for example, to the situation  w ith  com m unity defense, 
w hich is jointly supplied and w ould be modeled differ­
ently).
In the payoff m atrix  of table 1 , B is the value of collec­
tive good one forager can acquire, b is the value of pri­
vate good, and n  is the  num ber of foragers in  the group. 
The m atrix  depicts the boundary conditions. The left 
colum n shows the payoffs to row w hen all others target 
the collective good; th e  right colum n shows row 's pay­
offs w hen all others target private goods. If row targets 
the collective good and all others do too (the upper left 
cell), row gets 1  In  of the nB  provided. Taking the  private 
good instead (the lower left cell), row gets i / n  of the 
[n — 1 ) B provided by the others plus the private good. 
If row is the only one to target collective goods (the 
upper right cell), then  nothing comes from the others 
and row keeps i / n  of the B. If no one targets collective 
goods, row gets only the private good. In th is model, the 
dom inant or evolutionarily stable (Maynard Sm ith 19 82) 
strategy depends on the relationship between B /n  and 
b. If B /n  > b, then  row does better to  target the collec­
tive good w hatever the others do,- targeting the collec­
tive good is the evolutionarily stable strategy. But if B/ 
n < b ,  then the evolutionarily stable strategy is targeting 
the private good. T he situation  in  w hich B /n  < b and B 
> b is the w ell-know n "prisoner's dilem m a" (Luce and 
Raiffa 1 9 5 7 ).
The prisoner's dilem m a illustrates w hat O lson called 
the logic of collective action. U nder m ost circum stances 
the members of a group w ill no t provide the am ount of
t a b l e  1
Consum ption Payoffs o f A lterna tive Strategies
A ll Others Target A ll Others Target
Collective Good Private Good
Target collective good nB/n B/n
Target private good (n -  1) B/n + b b
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a good common to all that would be in the best interest 
of the members collectively. Only where the acquisition 
rates for collective goods are n tim es higher than for 
private goods (where foragers' own i /n  of the collective 
good is greater than they could get from targeting the 
private good) will foragers maximize their consumption 
payoff by procuring the collective good.
The payoff matrix shows in general form the trade-offs 
indicated in the data assembled above from the IKung, 
Ache, and Hadza. In each of these cases, foragers earn 
more for their own family consumption by pursuing pri­
vate goods on their own and claiming shares of any col­
lective goods provided by others.
In the IKung case, a m an who gathers can expect a 
family consumption rate of 4,000- 6,000 Cal/day for that 
work plus 2,564 Cal on average from every big-game 
hunter (if ^T om a's performance in  July 1964  is repre­
sentative). The big-game hunter can expect only 2,564 
Cal/day for his own family plus his family's share from 
every other big-game hunter.
An Ache m an who targets plant foods will get 
580- 1 ,330  Cal/hr. for his family (4 7 .5% of his acquisi­
tion) plus a bit from other collectors (his family's share 
of the 52 .5% shared out by each) and his family's share 
of the 1 , 16 6  Cal/hr. shared out by each hunter. By con­
trast a hunter, though he gets the bit shared out by col­
lectors and the shares from other hunters, foregoes the 
580- 1 ,330  Cal/hr. from his own gathering for the 174  
Cal/hr. that is his own share of the game he bags.
A Hadza m an will get 3 ,900- 10,000  Cal/day for his 
family from gathering plant foods and can claim about 
900 Cal/day from every hunter. If he hunted himself, he 
could expect to keep about 900 Cal from his own kills 
plus his 900 Cal share from each other hunter. In each 
of these cases, if men sought the foraging alternative 
that gave them  the highest family consumption, they 
would gather rather than hunt, targeting private instead 
of collective goods.
Measuring Nutritional Payoffs
Energy can be a poor measure of nutritional utility  when 
comparing resources w ith  very different nutrient com­
positions (Hill et al. 1987 , Hill 1988 ). Gathered resources 
usually have small fractions of fats and proteins, though 
nuts (like mongongos) are a notable exception. Hunted 
resources are almost entirely composed of fats and pro­
teins. If the nutritional value of an additional un it of 
these nutrients varies both with the total am ount of 
food available and with the nutrient composition of that 
total (Hill 1988 ), the relative consum ption payoffs for a 
hunter's fraction of his score may be underestimated.
Hill (1988 ) makes the usual assum ptions—the ones 
under question here—that acquisition choices are m oti­
vated by consumption goals and that acquisition approx­
imately equals consumption. They allow him  to use 
data on acquisition rates for different resources and the 
composition of forager diets to infer differing marginal 
rates of substitution for these macronutrients. He argues
that if an Ache m an could earn 2,800 Cal/hr. gathering 
but hunts and stops for honey to get 1 ,340  Cal/hr. in ­
stead, then he m ust value the second kind of calories at 
more than twice the first. If we consider his rate for 
hunting only, then he chooses 9 10  Cal/hr. of m eat over 
2,800 C al/hour of gathered food, valuing m eat more 
than three tim es as m uch as gathered resources. If the 
m ultiplier is large enough, then for the model of table
1 , i /n  of the B m ay be greater than b. This will make 
the collective action problem disappear because foragers 
maximize their own nutritional gains by targeting the 
collective goods. For the Ache, the protein and fat m ulti­
plier (P) would have to be large enough to satisfy the 
inequality 1 3 % (9 10 P + 430 ) >  47 .5% (2 ,800)—greater 
than ro.7 7 . For the IKung, the m acronutrient composi­
tion of both mongongo nuts and m eat is fat and protein. 
This ought to inflate the value of rare carbohydrates but 
suggests no m ultipliers for the alternatives considered 
here. For the Hadza, for Bln  to be greater than b, assum­
ing n  to be 8 (a num ber of families), P would have to 
satisfy P 900 >  3 ,900- 10 ,000 . P would have to be greater 
than 4.3 and sometimes greater than 1 1 .
The complexity introduced by comparing foods with 
different m acronutrients can be avoided where both col­
lective and private goods are composed of the same mac­
ronutrients, perhaps mongongo nuts and m eat for the 
IKung, more certainly large and small game. Among the 
Ache, m en and wom en take the same nongame re­
sources. W ithin this set, carbohydrates only, some re­
sources are more widely shared (Kaplan 1983 , Kaplan 
and Hill 198512). If there were no differences in return 
rates, foragers seeking to maximize their family con­
sum ption should target the private goods, those less 
widely shared. Women do, but m en take more of the 
collective resources (Hawkes 1 9 9 1 ). This suggests that, 
as when they hunt, m en do not gather to maximize their 
family's consumption but target collective goods in­
stead.
In the case of the Hadza, m acronutrients can be held 
constant by comparing m eat acquisition strategies, one 
targeting collective and the other private goods. Unlike 
the IKung or the Ache, Hadza hunters are big-game spe­
cialists; only about 1 % of the weight of game taken 
comes from small animals (Hawkes, O'Connell, and 
Blurton Jones 1 9 9 1 ). Yet small game is abundant in their 
habitat, and on rare occasions m en set snares. Hawkes 
et al. report an experiment in which a sample of Hadza 
men agreed to hun t small animals and set snares for a 
sequence of days to see what incomes they could earn 
this way. When small animals are taken they are not 
widely shared. Results showed that mean earnings were 
m uch lower than for big game but that failure rates were 
m uch lower as well. A model based on these measure­
ments showed that, as in the payoff m atrix of table 1 , if 
men sought to maximize their chances of feeding meat 
to their children they would h u n t or trap small animals 
instead of targeting large animals only. That model at­
tended to the variance in returns ignored in the model 
here. The high long-term mean daily rate for Hadza big- 
game hunters (a function of the enormous size of their
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prey) obscures m any days of failure. This extrem e vari­
ance could have especially large effects on children. 
Continuing research on nutritional payoffs for different 
food types and on the effects of different consum ption 
schedules is clearly in  order. We need to  know  w hat 
difference it m akes for a consum er to receive a large 
portion of m eat rarely (e.g., 2 kg every three weeks) or a 
sm all am ount m ore frequently (e.g., 50 g each day) and 
how th is effect varies w ith  age and sex.
These considerations show th a t in  at least som e cases 
a higher value placed on the  m acronutrients in  a shared 
good could m ake the public-goods problem  disappear. 
Yet a very robust pattern  in  resource choice would re­
m ain even if large m ultipliers were justified. Foraging 
m en tend to  target widely shared resources. !Kung, 
Ache, and Hadza m en all spend substantial (though 
quite different) am ounts of tim e supplying collective 
goods. The conclusion supported by th is analysis is tha t 
under a wide array of circum stances they would not tar­
get these resources if they  sought to  m axim ize their own 
or their fam ily's consum ption.
Selective Incentives
The payoff m atrix  of table 1  suggests possible benefits 
distinct from consum ption of the good itself. W ith the 
payoffs represented in  the m atrix, individuals who ac­
quire collective goods increase their neighbors' con­
sum ption instead of their ow n fam ilies'. Foragers do bet­
ter to choose neighbors who provide collective goods. If 
there are advantages to being preferred as a neighbor, 
individuals can gain them  by trading off the  consum p­
tion advantages from targeting private goods and supply­
ing collective goods instead. Advantages m ay include 
deference in  decisions about travel, support in disputes 
(or at least reluctance on the part of others to side 
against them), and enhanced m ating opportunities. Pref­
erences in  association w ill be likely to have fitness con­
sequences for any social anim al—the m ore intensely so­
cial, the stronger the effect.
The social benefits to  be gained from providing collec­
tive goods w ill be frequency-dependent, the am ount of 
benefits one can capture depending on how m any others 
supply collective goods. This can be m odeled by assum ­
ing that no m atter w hat others do, each individual 
spends an am ount of social atten tion  w orth S to those 
receiving it, and further, th a t (1 ) all serve their own in ­
terests by paying a sim ilar am ount of social attention, 
(2 ) each individual allocates his or her social atten tion  
preferentially to those who target collective goods, (3 ) 
receiving social a tten tion  is a fitness benefit, and (4 ) 
m ore atten tion  is better than  less.
A very sim ple scenario provides a rationale for the 
first two assum ptions. If individuals m onitor cues in  
their environm ent to alert them  to both opportunities 
and dangers (e.g., food and predators), then  the behavior 
of others like them selves can provide an im portant set 
of cues. Individuals find it  in  their in terest to pay some 
am ount of social a ttention . If some of those they w atch
are m ore often associated w ith  opportunities for con­
sum ption, then  individuals w ill find it  in  their in terest 
to distribute their a tten tion  accordingly.
The second tw o assum ptions rely on an argum ent 
about the use of signals. If signaling plays a role in  gain­
ing m ates and allies and in  adjusting the behavior of 
competitors, then  there can be an advantage in having 
one's signals heard earlier and m ore widely. Those who 
receive preferential a tten tion  are (other things the same) 
followed m ore and responded to m ore quickly. Associ­
ates are thus m ore readily available to them  as allies and 
m ates and less likely to side against them  in disputes.
The boundaries of a sym m etrical 12-person game illus­
trating these payoffs appear in  the  payoff m atrix  of table
2 . Here the benefit is no t family consum ption bu t social 
attention. As in  the previous game, n  is the num ber of 
individuals in  the group. Here S is the benefit of all the 
atten tion  from one group m em ber. Entries show the so­
cial payoffs to row. If row targets collective goods and 
all others do too (the upper left cell), row gets a 1  In  share 
of the S from all other (22 — 1 ) group mem bers. If row is 
the only one to provide the  collective good, row gets all 
the atten tion  (the upper right cell). If row targets the 
private good and all others target the collective good (the 
lower left cell), then  all the a tten tion  goes to others. If 
no one targets the collective good, then  the social a tten ­
tion is equally or random ly distributed (the lower right 
cell). Since social a tten tion  is the only benefit counted 
in  this game, no m atte r how  sm all S is, as long as it is 
positive, row does better to target the collective good. 
Even though row earns no m ore social atten tion  w hen 
all target the collective good than  w hen none do, entries 
in  the top row are always higher. The evolutionarily sta­
ble strategy is targeting the collective good.
Olson (1 9 6 5 :60—6 1 ) noted th a t in  sm all groups social 
incentives could readily solve the public-goods problem, 
but he did no t go on to ask w hy individuals should re­
spond to social pressure by contributing collective 
goods. The trea tm ent here points in  the direction of an 
evolutionary basis for th a t social pressure and its effects. 
Those who prefer com panions likely to provide collec­
tive goods accrue consum ption advantages for this pref­
erence. The fitness advantage to  collective-good provid­
ers is the  a tten tion  they  get as a consequence. Those 
who happen to  be present to consum e the collective 
good cannot continue to free-ride on the  atten tion  paid 
by others as long as the collective good appears unpre- 
dictably. O nly by paying a tten tion  to  the location and 
activity of the collective-good suppliers do they con-
t a b l e  2
Social A tten tio n  Payoffs of A lternative Strategies
A ll Others Target All Others Target
Collective Good Private Good
Target collective good (n -  1) S/n (22 -  1) S
Target private good 0 (j2 — i ) S/n
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tinue their good fortune. If the model is complicated 
slightly to distinguish strategies of supplying more or 
less of a collective good as well as none at all, and indi­
viduals who are expected to supply more get more atten­
tion, then the evolutionarily stable strategy for those 
seeking attention is providing more of the collective 
good.
Second-order public-goods problems often lurk in ap­
parent solutions. Since incentives to collective-good pro­
viders m ust themselves be private goods (i.e., benefits 
that only providers get), supplying the incentives can 
engage the logic of collective action. If some award the 
attention that motivates the suppliers but others can 
regularly consume the collective good w ithout paying 
the price of attention, then attention will be underpro­
vided. This model avoids that problem by assuming that 
those who pay attention to suppliers are more often 
around to consume w hat they supply. There is then no 
incentive to "cheat." Connor (19 8 6 ) has suggested the 
label "pseudo-reciprocity" to distinguish cases such as 
these from the trading of delayed benefits.
The assum ption that suppliers get real benefits from 
attention alone because it makes their signals and invi­
tations heard first more often by more others is quite 
general. Anyone m ight seek these benefits. W hether the 
actual value of such a signaling advantage could be very 
large remains to be investigated. The model is very sen­
sitive to the assumptions about private benefits to all 
parties. If consumers got the same am ount of collective 
good whether or not they paid attention to providers, 
then those not paying attention could free-ride. If con­
sumers were around to get shares more often when they 
paid attention but were no more likely to respond to 
invitations and directions of suppliers even though they 
heard them  first, then the incentives to collective-good 
providers would disappear. In a less general model of 
some of the same trade-offs, I used an asymmetric game 
with gender differences and two strategies available for 
men and two for women (Hawkes 19 9 0 ). Private benefits 
to collective-good providers (who were called "show- 
offs"! were mating opportunities, and private benefits to 
m ating-opportunity providers were survival advantages 
to their children fathered by showoffs. The treatm ent 
here has the advantage of greater simplicity and general­
ity, but the private benefits are less readily illustrated 
with empirical examples.
The models are of course too simple to capture what 
actually goes on in foraging communities. Yet even the 
few variables in the general models are enough to show 
that two kinds of payoffs, family consumption and social 
attention, can trade off against each other. If so, those 
whose goal is to maximize their family's food consump­
tion should choose private goods and those whose goal 
is to maximize their social benefits should not. As with 
all trade-off problems, the optimal solution may be to 
provide only private or only collective goods or some 
mix of the two. Particular solutions will depend on the 
relative values of the two kinds of benefits—the m ar­
ginal costs and benefits of additional units of tim e allo­
cated one way or the other. These depend in turn  on an 
individual's own characteristics and on local ecology.
Implications
The m ost general implication of the data and argument 
presented here is that hunters often do not get the food 
consumption benefits from their work that have gener­
ally been assumed. This has special relevance to three 
issues arising in scenarios of hum an evolution, at least 
two of which are also relevant to the study of public- 
goods problems. First, the analysis challenges the view 
that hunting or competitive scavenging is generally a 
kind of paternal investm ent among hum an foragers. Sec­
ond, data reviewed do not support the proposition that 
variance reduction or delayed-return reciprocity ex­
plains sharing in foraging communities. Third, characteris­
tics of the resources foragers exploit combined w ith small- 
community social life impose trade-offs between consump­
tion benefits and social benefits. These trade-offs are not 
unique to m odem  circumstances, suggesting a link be­
tween features of subsistence resources and selection 
pressures on the character of hum an social behavior.
A striking implication of this argument involves dif­
ferences in foraging behavior by sex. If the fitness values 
of social attention and family food consum ption differ 
for m en and wom en and if these are competing benefits, 
then m en and wom en ought to prefer different trade­
offs and choose to forage for different resources. Gender 
differences in  foraging strategies are of course the 
usual pattern among ethnographically known hunter- 
gatherers, but this sexual division of labor is generally 
assumed to arise because it efficiently serves family pro­
duction goals. One striking difference between humans 
and other primates is that m en contribute to group food 
consumption, but I have argued that, in  spite of authori­
tative contrary assertions (Washburn and Lancaster 
1968 , Lovejoy 1 9 8 1 , Lancaster and Lancaster 19 8 3 , Alex­
ander 19 9 0 ), m uch of this contribution is not paternal 
investment. The material reviewed shows that men of­
ten choose the very resources least likely to give con­
sumption advantages to their own nuclear families. This 
choice can neither depend on nor reinforce either mar­
riage or confidence of paternity. Anthropologists have 
long noted that women make trade-offs w ith  child care 
that m en do not (Brown 1970 , Murdock and Provost 
19 7 3 , Hurtado 19 8 5 , Hurtado et al. 19 8 5 ). The argument 
here is that an additional trade-off plays an important 
role in foraging strategies. Family nutrition  as compared 
with alliance and m ating advantages will often give dif­
ferent relative fitness payoffs by sex because of the same 
fundamental asymmetries that lead women to invest 
more in  child care than do men.
These asymmetries may sometimes be subtle. Con­
sumption and socal benefits will be valuable to both 
m en and women, but marginal fitness gains for invest­
m ent in  each will often differ. The food that a woman, 
her young children, and her reproductive daughter con­
sume day by day will have a large impact on her repro­
ductive success through effects on her fecundability and 
the survivorship and fertility of her offspring. At the 
same time, wom en have less to gain (or lose) in disput­
ing other wom en over m ating access to m en than men 
have to gain (or lose) in  contests over access to women.
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This difference is especially great w here property rights 
are poorly defined and therefore m ates are no t valued 
for their w ealth. Still, under som e circum stances, 
wom en m ay use social a tten tion  to  gain assistance in 
child care from other women.
Offspring survivorship w ill affect a m an 's reproduc­
tive success as w ell as a w om an's, and his ow n general 
nutritional status w ill affect his fitness. Under some 
ecological circum stances fam ily provisioning m ay be his 
best bet, but under m any others the num ber of his m at­
ing opportunities and his success in  disputes w ith  other 
m en over m ating w ill likely have larger effects. M en 
w ill usually have m ore to  gain from  additional m ates 
than w ill wom en. Since any m an who gets m ore pater­
nity  than  other m en subtracts directly from his com peti­
tors' reproductive success, arms races in  m ating com pe­
tition  am ong m en can readily develop. It is consistent 
w ith  the  sim ple m odels here th a t if social atten tion  can 
be gained from supplying collective goods and if it  gives 
higher fitness returns than  fam ily provisioning, then 
w hen one m an seeks social attention, others m ust fol­
low su it or lose out. The correlation between hunting- 
success rank and m easures of reproductive success 
among the Ache m en (Kaplan and H ill 19 8 5 b) is consis­
ten t w ith  th is argument.
Because of the association betw een sharing and re­
source predictability, anthropologists have postulated 
risk reduction as an explanation for sharing. This expla­
nation requires no t only tha t those who provide shares 
for others receive shares them selves bu t also th a t those 
who do no t provide shares do n o t receive them . This 
contingency is no t observed empirically. In fact, it  is the 
lack of quid pro quo in  sharing patterns th a t has long 
drawn the a tten tion  of ethnologists (Lee 19 7 9 ; Sahlins 
19 6 5 , 1972 ,; H awkes 19 9 2 b). Some have considered the 
opening such sharing gives to "freeloaders" and have 
suggested th a t sanctions such as w itchcraft accusations 
(more likely to fall on anyone of deviant laziness) keep 
people working (e.g., Harris 19 8 9 ). Aside from the pub- 
lic-goods problem s th is poses (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 
19 9 2 ), i t  leaves salient aspects of the  em pirical reports 
unexplained. These show  "m ost people" working some, 
some people (often the m ost efficient) working relatively 
hard (e.g., H ill and Hawkes 19 8 3 , Hawkes et al. 19 8 5 , 
Hawkes 1 9 8 7 ). If people w orked only hard enough to 
m eet a m in im um  requirem ent set by the am ount others 
worked, the frequency-dependent standard would be 
prone to slide lower and lower as any working harder 
than  the current average reduced their effort.
Some have suggested th a t repaym ent to those who 
work harder and give m ore m ay be very long delayed, 
even indirect (e.g., Alexander 1 9 8 7 ). Formal modeling so 
far shows indirect reciprocity to  be at least as fragile 
(Boyd and Richerson r 989) as the direct exchange of de­
layed benefits (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1988 , M artinez 
Coll and H irshleifer 1 9 9 1 , Hawkes 19 9 2 a). Perhaps more 
im portant, a m odel of indirect reciprocity fails to supply 
any explanatory links betw een particular resource char­
acteristics, predictable differences in  the extent to 
which resources are shared, and associated patterns in  
resource choice.
The tolerated-theft m odel shows how  the economics 
of defensibility can m ake "ow nership" negotiable. W hen 
large anim als are procured unpredictably, excluding 
claim ants from access m ay be too expensive. The hun ter 
him self cannot afford to exclude others, nor can anyone 
else. If the  h un ter or another tried to  channel a large 
fraction to  favor a friend, the  friend w ould face demands 
for shares in  turn. W ith property rights under such con­
tinuing negotiation, large asynchronously acquired re­
sources are collective goods. Like th a t of any collective 
good, the consum ption value of the resource is rarely 
sufficient reason to  procure it. However, selective incen­
tives w ill m otivate suppliers.
Some aspects of the lives of contem porary foragers can 
be linked to special circum stances of the m odern world. 
The environm ents people exploit now differ from those 
of the past; regional histories often involve complex in ­
terdependencies betw een ethnographic subjects and 
their neighbors. People observed as foragers m ay have 
ancestors who made their livings in  other ways. This 
can lead investigators to  be suspicious of the  relevance 
of hunter-gatherer ethnography to  an understanding of 
our evolutionary history. But som e of the  lim its and 
choices th a t people confront from day to  day w hen they 
m ake their living by hunting  and gathering exemplify 
constraints and trade-offs of great antiquity. This pro­
vides an opportunity to evaluate theoretically m otivated 
hypotheses and m ay stim ulate the developm ent of new 
ones.
If the trade-off betw een family consum ption and so­
cial atten tion  underlies the resource choices of m odern 
foragers, it is a trade-off w ith  a long history. Paradoxi­
cally, this very "m ateria list"  evolutionary economics 
anticipates the problem  th a t no t all incentives are "m a­
terial." M odeling and m easuring both  social and family- 
consum ption benefits w ill help us understand not only 
variation in  resource choice among foragers bu t also 
variation in  cooperation and tendencies to supply other 
collective goods in  these and other hum an com m u­
nities.
Comments
J O N  A L T M A N
Centre for Aboriginal Econom ic Policy Research. 
Faculty o f Arts, The Australian N ational University, 
Canberra, A .C.T. 0200, Australia. 3 1  111 93
Hawkes seeks to replace the  orthodox reciprocity model 
of hunter-gatherer sharing of game w ith  a public-goods 
model w hich postulates th a t m edium -sized and large 
game are regarded as com m on property in  the sense th a t 
they are owned and consum ed by all. This com m ent 
uses A ustralian data to argue th a t large game has charac­
teristics of a private good, th a t the sharing of game is an 
effective risk-m inim ising strategy, and th a t ecological 
constraints regularly lim it the choice of hunting stra t­
egy. The data were collected in  w estern A rnhem  Land
Copyright © 1993. All rights reserved.
3 5 2  | c u r r e n t  a n t h r o p o l o g y  Volume 34, Number 4, August-October 1993
among contemporary Gunwinggu hunter-gatherers (Alt­
man 19 8 7 ) and among Gidjingali people in  coastal cen­
tral Arnhem Land (Meehan 19 8 2 ). Some of these data 
have been used to argue that rights in large game consti­
tute a form of property—the opposite of Hawkes's posi­
tion (Altman and Peterson 19 8 8 ].
Among Gunwinggu, sharing of game is an extremely 
complicated process, and at best fieldworkers can trace 
only first-round distribution. Even such distribution is 
complicated by a range of factors including the ritual 
status of the hunter, the kin relations of fellow hunters 
and coresidents, the size of the residential group, and 
seasonal and ritual consum ption restrictions. There is 
certainly a cultural expectation that large game will be 
widely shared, but in practice this may not occur be­
cause of competing obligations. The only sure way of 
guaranteeing game to one's im m ediate family is to be 
the successful hunter. Paradoxically, at times, ritual re­
strictions may result in the successful hunter's being 
excluded from consumption, but his immediate family, 
usually residing in the same household or household 
cluster, will partake of his share. In short, there is a 
material incentive to succeed. This view is supported by 
quantitative data collected among Gunwinggu: success­
ful hunters received more game (Altman 19 8 7 :12 9 —50).
There are opporunities for the successful to restrict 
wider distribution by, for example, consuming large 
game where hunted, and such action can be observed (by 
fieldworkers, at any rate), but this is counter to cultural 
norms. As one generally coresides w ith  kin, there is 
little reason to exclude these people from access to 
game. Furthermore, in tropical Australia large game has 
a very lim ited life: it m ust be consumed quickly or it 
rots. The fact that game is not a public good is very 
evident when hunters competitively bid for a share of 
hunted game. At times, people go to extraordinary 
lengths to deliver an im mediate surplus to kin rather 
than merely allowing camp coresidents to share in con­
sumption.
Hawkes alludes to longitudinal data demonstrating 
that sharing does not result in balanced reciprocity in 
the long term, but I find this unconvincing. I am not 
aware of any ethnography that includes quantitative 
data for a group over a long enough period to assess 
whether the distribution of game balances over time. 
Quantitative data collected w ith Gunwinggu over one 
seasonal cycle indicated not only that sharing greatly 
ameliorated household variations in  production but also 
that resources flowed in a predictable direction: from 
households w ith young, dynamic, and productive h u n t­
ers to those w ith older, more ritually senior and less 
productive men.
Hawkes assumes that hunters face a simple choice of 
resources to target; she accepts as unproblematic the 
common and somewhat oversimplified view in hunter- 
gatherer studies that gathered resources are both predict­
able and available while the hunting of game is both 
unpredictable and high-risk. Such a view overlooks eco­
logical factors that greatly constrain resource choice dur­
ing some seasons. For example, among Gunwinggu, 
large game was the subsistence staple during the wet
season, heavily supplemented, in  the contemporary con­
text, by store-bought carbohydrates. It is unclear how 
"the carbohydrate gap" would have been bridged under 
traditional conditions, when seasonality and flooding 
greatly restricted the availability of almost all gathered 
foods. This was, w ithout doubt, a tim e of relative dietary 
hardship (Altman 19 8 7 , M eehan 19 8 2 ). A collective 
hunting strategy may have been essential to m eet a 
group's m inim um  dietary requirements, but even at this 
tim e game was not necessarily a collective resource.
Hawkes presents nonproducing consumers as free­
loaders, but this view very m uch depends on cultural 
perceptions of who should produce, restrictions on po­
tential producers, people's other recognised specialities, 
and so on. There is no doubt tha t freeloaders can be 
a source of extreme contention and disputation among 
hunter-gatherers, but in such circumstances effective 
strategies are adopted: subgroups may collude to con­
sume game where slaughtered, or people may lie about 
their returns, sneaking game into camp late at night. 
Eventually disputes m ay erupt that result in changes in 
the composition of coresiding groups and the temporary 
abandonment or expulsion of freeloaders.
Ultimately, Hawkes ends w ith a conundrum. A m ate­
rialist model grounded in the neoclassical-economic 
concept of public goods concludes w ith the cultural ex­
planation that social benefits accrue to successful hun t­
ers. Hawkes provides no empirical support for the hy­
pothesis that success in hunting game as a public good 
converts to accum ulated individual social benefit, pre­
sumably as a private good. This is a hypothesis with 
which "m ainstream " social anthropologists and hunter- 
gatherer specialists would be very comforable, but it is 
immaterial to the argument w hether game is or is not a 
public good.
S T E P H E N  B E C K E R M A N
Anthropology Department, Pennsylvania State 
University, University Park, Pa. 16802, U.S.A. 1 111 93
Hawkes has taken her customary hard look at familiar 
anthropological assumptions and come up w ith a typi­
cally provocative reinterpretation. Salutary as the exer­
cise is, two cautions are in order.
The first: The variance-reduction hypothesis for shar­
ing of unpredictable large-package resources should not 
be discarded hastily. Variance reduction is not incom ­
patible w ith  using sharing for the acquisition of social 
benefits; the argument m ust be that the latter is a 
stronger influence on sharing behavior, not that the lat­
ter logically excludes the former. The argument for the 
relative unim portance of variance reduction has some 
soft spots. The Ache, Hadza, and !Kung data runs failing 
to verify food repayment are all short w ith  respect to 
the life-span of the organism. Axelrod's computer tour­
naments, in which im m ediate tit-for-tat strategies out- 
competed strategies w ith longer memories, provided no 
opportunity for the sort of pleading and haranguing 
prom inent in the ethnographic literature about hunter- 
gatherer sharing. (While description of current inequities
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m ay be prom inent in  dem ands for sharing, i t  strains cre­
dulity to  argue th a t m em ories of past generosity are u n ­
im portant to those on w hom  the demands are made. 
The literature bursts w ith  accounts of the w eight of reci­
procity in  egalitarian societies.) The trade-off between 
increasing or regularizing the food consum ption of the 
adult m ale's own fam ily and increasing or regularizing 
that of other fam ilies (for social a tten tion  payoffs) is ru ­
dim entarily posed. If (as w ill often be the case in  hunt- 
ing-and-gathering societies) m any of the other families 
are those of ego's brothers, sisters, and brothers-in-law 
and their offspring are nieces and nephews, then  ego has 
a fitness in terest in the food consum ption of all these 
people. It is an in terest th a t m ay be served not only by 
giving them  game to eat but also by giving them  game 
to give away in  turn, so th a t their generosity m ay influ­
ence the  future behavior of others toward them . Adding 
these considerations to the nu tritiona l payoffs (particu­
larly to children) of the high-quality nu trien ts often sup­
plied by the large game favored by m en leads to a less 
than robust rejection of the variance-reduction hypothe­
sis. The m ajor point of Haw kes's article, th a t variance 
reduction alone is probably insufficient to  explain the 
foraging options pursued by m en, remains.
The second: The idea of social attention, a partible 
"private good" w ith  ego's allo tm ent going to  h im  alone, 
m ay not be the only way (or the best way) to  th ink  about 
the nonfood benefits accruing to a provider of collective 
goods in  food. One likely resu lt of ego's targeting of big 
game in  his foraging is his holding a lo t of other m en 
around h im  to partake of his largesse in  shared meat. 
Ego's (and everyone else's) m ajor benefit from the pres­
ence of these other m en m ay be in  com m on defense 
against wife raiding. Com m on defense is a public good. 
Strangely, i t  m ay n o t be true  th a t this public good per­
m its freeloading. If m en in  the raided group have no 
choice bu t to fight together, then  cheating (consuming 
the food w ithou t paying the "price" of com m on defense) 
is impossible.
Moving out of the realm  of public goods and into the 
slippery terrain betw een the fully public and the strictly 
private, another plausible benefit of conspicuous sharing 
is the political clout to  acquire additional wives for ego's 
sons. W hile the fitness benefits to ego (in grandchildren) 
are obvious, these benefits can accrue only by virtue of 
benefits to his sons' mother(s) and to  the sons them ­
selves. These kinds of inherently  fam ilial benefits ap­
pear (maybe I'm  wrong here) to violate the spirit of 
Haw kes's em phasis on fitness benefits to  ego tha t are 
alternative to those realized w ith in  the family.
A nother potential glitch is the  possibility th a t the big- 
game hunters are deceived and exploited by the benefi­
ciaries of their efforts. Adm iring glances, easy deference, 
and coy insinuations of trysts in  the  m oonlight m ay feed 
those m ore dedicated to acquiring private goods and 
nourish a big-game h u n ter's  ego for years—only to end 
in a realization in  N im rod 's old age tha t all th a t public 
adm iration produced little  in  the way of effective sup­
port in  tough disputes and none of those whispered flir­
tations ever culm inated in  a biologically significant as­
signation.
As is her habit, Hawkes has reform ulated the conven­
tional w isdom  as a testable hypothesis requiring more 
and m ore detailed field data. I look forward to the round 
of research kicked off by her la test questions.
R O Y  R I C H A R D  G R I N K E R
D epartm ent o f Anthropology, The George W ashington 
University, W ashington, D.C. 20052, U.S.A. 26 11 93
This is a well-crafted paper w ith  a sound and coherent 
methodology. It addresses im portant questions in the 
study of sharing in  foraging societies. One reason for its 
coherence is th a t its au thor is concerned w ith  reproduc­
tive fitness and thus operates w ith in  the narrow  con­
fines of a cost-benefit explanatory scheme. In so doing, 
she perpetuates a functionalist logic th a t is by now dis­
m issed by the m ajority of cultural anthropologists. That 
this paper's theoretical foundations seem  anachronistic 
is ironic, since Hawkes pursues another anachronism  in 
taking hunter-gatherers ou t of their proper or historical 
tim e and treating them  as ethnographic analogies for 
the distant past. I w ill leave the problem s of biological 
perspective to  be addressed by others and focus instead 
on the separation of hunter-gatherers from the social 
contexts in  w hich they live.
W hat is especially shocking, although consistent w ith  
Haw kes's intentions, is the dismissal, in  just a few sen­
tences, of " the  special circum stances of the m odem  
w orld." One of these "special circum stances" is the rela­
tionships hunter-gatherers have w ith  nonforaging neigh­
bors. The groups represented in  her analysis are treated 
in  virtual isolation from  their contem porary or past so­
cial relationships and regional histories. The Lese farm ­
ers and Efe (Pygmy) foragers of Zaire w ith  w hom  I work 
are an interesting case because the foragers cannot be 
understood apart from their relations w ith  the farmers 
and because the sharing of food betw een these groups 
illustrates som e faults in  H aw kes's scheme.
Lese-Efe relations are organized prim arily at the Lese 
house. Each house ideally consists of a man, his wife or 
wives, their children, and an Efe partner (although the 
Efe partner does no t reside in  the  Lese house). Both the 
Lese and the Efe define their partnership as a beneficial 
division of labor in  w hich the Lese partner shares cu lti­
vated foods in  return  for m eat and honey. Partners say 
that they give things to get things, but this econom istic 
model conflicts w ith  both  the practice of Lese-Efe rela­
tionships and the conceptual schemes and vocabulary 
Lese and Efe use to represent them .
My inform ants consistently  articulated an econo­
m istic ideology in  w hich they identified them selves ei­
ther as foragers (Efe) or farmers (Lese) and defined Lese- 
Efe relations in  term s of the  exchange of m eat and honey 
for cultivated foods. But, as I have show n (Grinker n.d.), 
the Lese obtain m ost of their m eat by them selves or 
from other Lese, and the  Efe obtain m any cultivated 
foods from  people o ther than  their partners. Indeed, dur­
ing 19 8 5 —87 , exchanges betw een partners were rare. 
Lese and Efe seldom  m ention  the variety of activities 
they share, especially in  Lese villages,- among other
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things, the Efe provide labor in  the Lese gardens, serve 
as the m ain participants in  m any Lese rituals, and assist 
in Lese chores. The relationships that constitute every­
day practice are thus dissociated from the ideology of 
practice; they are conceived as residual to economics. 
This separation seems at odds w ith  a conventional no­
tion of the gift economy—that people spend great time 
and effort elaborating kinship, clientship, and other 
moral relations to m ask their self-interested and eco­
nomic behavior. The Lese and the Efe frame their rela­
tionship, including their identities as farmers and forag­
ers, in an idiom of the economy; in other words, the 
division of labor is an ethnic process, w ith  "forager" and 
"farmer" as ethnic identities. W hat may appear to the 
anthropologist to be a fairly simple cost-benefit relation 
is far more complex when one considers the conceptual 
scheme in which economics are embedded. Neither 
sharing nor interethnic social relations determine the 
other; rather, they are m utually constitutive.
Following Hawkes, one could argue that the Lese-Efe 
relationship is functional because, through sharing, the 
Efe receive social attention from the Lese, that is, those 
outside their families. The point I want to stress here is 
that it is circular reasoning to say that the Efe give m eat 
to those outside their families in order to establish social 
relations w ith  the Lese, because it is the Lese-Efe rela­
tionship itself that defines the giving of meat. Regarding 
Hawkes's concerns w ith  fitness, the partnerships do not 
significantly influence the wealth or marriageability of 
Efe; people w ith  or w ithout partners marry and repro­
duce, and physically and m entally handicapped Efe men, 
though often bachelors, can and do have partnerships.
Lese and Efe do not believe that sharing between part­
ners lies outside of the family, and they use the term  
oki, meaning the division or distribution of foods w ithin 
the house, to denote the transfer of foods between part­
ners. As members of the same house, partners are "fam ­
ily" and have rights in  one another's foods. The Efe do 
not "exchange" foods any more than fathers or mothers 
exchange food w ith their children. In contrast, transfers 
of food outside the partnership are construed as either 
oka (purchase) or iregi (exchange). These observations 
have two im portant implications. First, when we ana­
lyze sharing we m ust identify the specific social rela­
tionships involved. Second, comparative studies of shar­
ing m ust provide culturally specific definitions of the 
"family." Although Hawkes is concerned w ith  family 
consumption, it is not clear w hat constitutes the family 
in the various societies she discusses. The undefined 
term "family" is juxtaposed to "others," w ith others, I 
assume, representing those less than a certain fraction 
of relatedness away from a given ego.
h e n r y  h a r p e n d i n g
Department of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State 
University, University Park, Pa. 16802, U.S.A. 3 h i 93
The am ount of tim e m en spend hunting large animals 
in foraging societies is an embarrassment to cultural 
ecologists and sociobiologists because it does not m ax­
im ize energy capture for either the group, the family, or 
the individual. Hawkes offers several explanations.
The m ost interesting is one that she does not pursue- 
that there is some critical nutrien t or set of nutrients 
that has not yet been discovered. If there were such a 
megamammal nutrient, then there would be no problem 
understanding why m en hun t the way they do.
Her other suggestion is tha t "social attention" is the 
payoff to good hunters. This social attention m ust en­
hance the fitness of the recipient. There are suggestions 
that in  some groups it m ay be sexual access to females, 
but we knew paternity among the !Kung in the sixties 
and there was no evidence at all of greater sexual access 
for good hunters.
Hunting large animals is not the only puzzling ineffi­
ciency in hum an subsistence. Farmers who don't pro­
duce very m uch grain eat the grain, but farmers who 
produce a lot feed the grain to chickens and then eat 
eggs (Clark and Haswell 19 6 6 ). Why convert ten calories 
of wheat into one calorie of egg?
We have a deep belief in mystery nutrients that are 
found only in  certain foods; this is why we th ink that 
we need "balanced diets." Protein was the leading candi­
date for being the critical mystery nutrient for decades, 
but its prominence seems to have declined, perhaps in 
parallel w ith  the political im pact of the American dairy 
industry. All this may, however, reflect an ancient run­
away process. Our preferences for m eat over nuts and 
eggs over porridge may m ake little  more adaptive sense 
than the lion's m ane or the peacock's tail. I don't know 
how to test this hypothesis, but w ithout tests we are 
left w ith just another version of the sequitur that cul­
ture makes us do it.
R O B E R T  T. J E S K E
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Indiana-Purdue University Fort Wayne, Fort Wayne, 
Ind. 46803-1499, U.S.A. 1 1  11 93
This article is a sound contribution to the growing body 
of literature that examines optimal behaviors in hum ans 
from a perspective beyond merely counting calories. 
Many have argued against viewing hum ans as Homo 
economicus, and indeed, m any models that link hum an 
behavior to a rational energy-input/energy-yield strategy 
are poorly validated by empirical data. Hawkes does a 
credible job of showing that neither energy-optimization 
nor the more sophisticated risk-m inim ization models 
necessarily explain big-game hunting and m eat sharing 
among foragers. Since m en reduce short-term  family nu­
tritional intake by hunting and apparently get no de­
monstrable long-term caloric reward through reciproc­
ity, she argues that they get increased reproductive 
success through "social attention." At heart, she pro­
poses that males will hun t and share m eat in order to 
gain sexual favors from m ultiple women, thereby in­
creasing their reproductive success. Women, in contrast, 
will maximize their reproductive success by getting as 
m uch high-yield nutritional material for themselves and 
their children as possible through gathering and sharing
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m eat from m ales who hun t, presum ably m ating w ith  
males who provide m eat. Males w ho m ight otherw ise 
freeload on o ther m en 's hunting  are pressured in to  h u n t­
ing in  order to  keep good hunters from  co-opting all of 
the wom en. It appears th a t m en can either be efficient 
calorie collectors w ith  low social a tten tion  or inefficient 
calorie collectors w ith  high social attention.
This m odel sets up a social economy w ith  several im ­
plications th a t are potentially  testable. First, reproduc­
tive success in  m ales who are successful hunters/sharers 
(hence receive high social attention) should be dem on­
strably higher than  in  m ales who are less successful 
hunters. Second, young m ales in  need of social atten tion  
should be the m ost active hunters; successful m ales 
who already have access to  females, however, should 
not be able to taper off hun ting  and begin to  enjoy the 
fruits of o thers ' hunting. There should be a correlation 
between reduction in  a m an 's hunting success and re­
duction in  his siring of children. In light of Hawkes's 
dism issal of delayed-reciprocity models, we should see 
a tight fit betw een m eat incom e and sexual activity. U n­
fortunately, she does no t provide the  data to show that 
there is a strong connection betw een hunting success 
and reproductive success. U ntil there are good data to 
support the connection betw een the  two, her model pro­
vides no m ore explanation th an  any of the others offered 
to date.
There are, however, additional questions th a t arise 
from H aw kes's model. In order for a m an 's reproductive 
success to increase as a resu lt of his hunting  prowess, 
wom en m ust have an incentive to have sex w ith  suc­
cessful hunters. If all are sharing equally in  the hun ter's  
success, there is no incentive for a w om an to  provide 
m ore children for the m eat supplier than  for the nonsup­
plier. How, then, does the  h un ter increase his reproduc­
tive success, unless w om en increase their reproductive 
success by offering sex for meat? W hat is i t  about meat, 
if not nutrition, th a t m akes it  the  chosen m edium  for 
this postulated social exchange?
A further in teresting question is, If there is an evolu­
tionary explanation for m ales' hunting  big game, then  
why don 't m ore do it? H aw kes's own examples suggest 
tha t relatively few m en  atta in  the  big-game/social- 
attention payoff. Why do m any if no t m ost m en seem 
to go for the  energy-retum, low -hunting payoff? Is there 
an age factor involved? W hat o ther factors enhance or 
degrade the  social a tten tion  m en  m ay get from hunting? 
I believe th a t asking these kinds of questions and con­
ducting m ore sophisticated investigations in to  aspects 
of nu trition  and risk  reduction w ill provide us w ith  in ­
creasingly better insights in to  w hy foragers work and 
share.
N I C O L A S  P E T E R S O N
Departm ent o f Archaeology and Anthropology, The 
Australian N ational U niversity, Canberra, A.C.T.
2601, Australia. 3 1  1x1 93
The problem  w ith  m uch  of the w riting by evolutionary 
ecologists is no t th a t it  is wrong bu t tha t i t  is sociologi­
cally impoverished. W orking w ith  a series of sim ple con­
trasts betw een individual and society, biology and cu l­
ture, and selfishness and altru ism  provides for great 
clarity in  the definition of problem s and their analysis 
bu t does no t do justice to  the com plexity of social reality 
and frequently leads to  banal conclusions. Thus th is pa­
per concludes that, "Paradoxically, th is very 'm aterial­
is t ' evolutionary economics anticipates the problem  tha t 
no t all incentives are 'm a te ria l.'"  Who ever thought 
they were?
Hawkes invokes the  selfishness-altruism  dichotom y 
to ask why foragers ever target resources th a t w ill go 
m ostly to  others rather th an  to their spouses and chil­
dren. A com m only heard justification for polarising 
problems in  th is way is th a t it leads to  testable hypothe­
ses. The first th a t Hawkes considers is tha t sharing is a 
m eans of risk  reduction. T his is set aside, however, be­
cause i t  "lacks em pirical support." T he im plication tha t 
sharing does not reduce risk  in  som e situations seems 
unlikely. W hat is wrong here is the  idea th a t sharing is 
only  a m eans of risk  reduction. Sharing is a complex 
behaviour w hich cannot be reduced to  a single conse­
quence or significance.
The second hypothesis is th a t " the  incentive for pro­
viding widely shared goods is favorable a tten tion  from 
other group m em bers," w hich gives the  m ale sharers a 
m ating advantage. O n the basis of Australian ethnogra­
phy (which has to  be encompassed by the generalisation 
if i t  is valid) i t  can be said th a t hun ters do receive a tten ­
tion (even if i t  is often m arked negatively by their being 
deliberately ignored) in  th a t they confirm  their potential 
as good sons-in-law by providing m eat to  their future 
w ives' parents; they enhance their access to religious 
knowledge by gifts to  the older m en of their descent 
group; they enhance their status m ore generally; and, in 
long-delayed reciprocity, they nurtu re  those who nu r­
tured them  w hen they  were young. Providing m eat to 
in-laws is som ething all young m en have to do in  order 
to secure a bride. Thus there is no doubt th a t supplying 
m eat is related to  m ating—b u t th is is m ating by all men, 
and it is no t the sole or even th e  m ost im portant deter­
m inant of how m any wives a m an m ay have or how 
m any children.
The th ird  hypothesis is th a t sharing takes place as 
tolerated theft in  situations in  w hich the cost of de­
fending a resource is greater th an  the benefits to be had 
by doing so. T he evidence adduced for tolerated theft is 
so-called dem and sharing. But to  construe dem and shar­
ing as tolerated theft (that is, taking w ithou t right or 
obligation) is to  m isunderstand th e  nature of interper­
sonal sociality in  egalitarian societies. D em and sharing 
is testing, asserting, and substantiating behaviour, not 
evidence for large gam e's being a public good.
The conclusion to  be drawn from the foregoing is well 
stated by Hawkes: "T he m odels are . . . too sim ple to 
capture w hat actually goes on in  foraging com m uni­
ties." For social anthropologists part of the problem  is 
th a t m uch of th e  dialogue of the evolutionary ecologists 
is in  an evolutionary tim e frame, w hich m eans that 
some of the  com plexities of present-day social behaviour 
m ay be noise even w hen they are v ital to social life and
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social reproduction. More concern w ith the present 
would help break down the binary contrasts that vitiate 
so m uch of their work. It m ight also lead them  to pro­
vide more relevant data. Despite the emphasis on the 
conferral of a m ating advantage, we have no demo­
graphic information at all. By now the effective hunters 
that Richard Lee was writing about in the sixties m ust 
have grandchildren: have they been propagating their 
genes more effectively than the rest? Doubtless nothing 
statistically significant could be said from what is likely 
to be a small sample, but asking the question m ight well 
prompt more social analysis.
E R I C  A L D E N  S M I T H
Department of Anthropology, University of 
Washington, Seattle, Wash. 9819s, U.S.A. 15  111 93
This article offers a critique of the received wisdom con­
cerning hunter-gatherer food sharing and proposes an al­
ternative explanation for same. The critique seems to 
me fairly effective, if not definitive, but I do not find the 
alternative compelling or even comprehensible.
The critique has two elements, one theoretical and 
the other empirical. The theoretical point is that a col­
lective benefit from food sharing such as risk (variance) 
reduction does not mean that rational choice or natural 
selection will favor its provision by self-interested indi­
viduals. This point has been recognized for some time 
by anthropologists w ith  an evolutionary-ecology orien­
tation (Kaplan and Hill 198512, Blurton Jones 1984) and 
modeled explicitly as a "prisoner's dilem ma" (Smith 
1988 , Smith and Boyd 19 9 0 ). This article articulates this 
point for a broader anthropological audience. But what 
is unstable in a one-shot prisoner's-dilemma game is not 
necessarily so in  a repeated one (Taylor 19 8 7 ), and an 
ongoing pattern of food sharing is certainly not a one- 
shot interaction (Smith 19 8 8 ). The empirical critique 
consists of demonstrating that for the few cases where 
we have the requisite data, contributions to collective 
goods (shared game] are not balanced: some hunters con­
sistently bring in the lioness's share of the harvest, and 
poorer hunters gain by sharing in such largesse. Further­
more, those who contribute little  to the collective har­
vest by voluntary failure to try hard are (allegedly) not 
therefore excluded from their share. But I read the ethno­
graphic data from a num ber of other cases (such as Inuit) 
to contradict the notion that slackers will not face any 
sanctions or loss of collective benefits, and three ethno­
graphic cases are not a particularly robust basis on 
which to rest the case against the risk-reduction expla­
nation. Hence m y conclusion that this critique of the 
conventional wisdom is to be taken seriously but not 
accepted as definitive.
Turning to the proposed alternative, I will grant that 
the m athem atical derivation of results is done correctly 
and with exemplary clarity, but I question the logical 
connection between this particular model (table 2 ) and 
the real (or even ideal-type) world. The formulation be­
gins with "social a ttention" as a simple function of prox­
imity: individuals pay attention to good hunters because 
doing so will bring them  a larger share of the catch sim ­
ply by their being nearby when it is brought in. This in 
turn is assumed to benefit the providers, because "pref­
erences in association" will have fitness benefits in any 
social animal. There is no tem ptation to underprovide 
attention (to "free-ride"), because there is a direct link 
between proximity, attention, and getting better shares.
If I have represented the argument correctly, here are 
my objections: First, I do not read the ethnographic liter­
ature as indicating that proxim ity is usually required for 
receipt of a share. Sharing is often ritualized, as in the 
seal-sharing partnerships of m any Inuit (van de Velde 
19 5 6 ), or in  any case does not necessarily appear to favor 
those who hang around the provider. Second, proximity 
or other forms of "social atten tion" can be costly to the 
recipients, exposing them  to "tolerated theft" (Blurton 
Jones 19 84 ). If proxim ity is the key to getting a bigger 
share, good foragers m ay find their movements, their 
very foraging success impeded by followers eager to par­
take of their catch. Hawkes m ay reply that it is not prox­
im ity that is implicated in "social attention" but such 
particulars as "deference in decisions about travel, sup­
port in disputes . . . and enhanced mating opportuni­
ties." Fine, but then we are in a situation of delayed 
reciprocity. This raises all the issues of collective action, 
sanctioning, free-riding, and so on, posed in the original 
risk-reduction formulation of the conventional wisdom. 
Instantiated as exchange of food for social goods (mating, 
deference, support), the proposed solution solves the col­
lective action problem of risk reduction simply by defer­
ring it to the second-order collective action problem of 
social exchange.
In sum, I do not see how the magic of "social a tten­
tion" solves the sharing conundrum. Either the atten­
tion is too diffuse and problematic to m otivate share 
givers or it is a collective good that will not motivate 
share takers (at least not any more effectively than the 
collective good of sharing-as-risk-reduction). I consider 
the received view of sharing challenged but not defeated 
and certainly not replaced by a stronger contender.
G E O R G E  W . W E N Z E L
Department of Geography, McGill University, 
Montreal, Que., Canada H3A  2K6. 17  111 93
This paper represents a substantial contribution to the 
long-running discussion in anthropology concerning 
hunter-gatherer strategies of resource exploitation and 
resource sharing. Indeed, Hawkes's central question— 
Why do hunter-gatherers work?—can be so interpreted 
as to provide an im portant lead into the m uch larger 
question of the social dynamic(s) and meaning of subsis­
tence as a culturally organized set of activities.
More specifically, however, this article has two ele­
m ents that are of im m ediate interest. The first is that 
it explicitly links the choices hunters m ake about the 
kind of prey they exploit to decisions regarding resource 
allocation w ith in  the larger population of which they are
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a part. W hile it has been some tim e since the behavioral 
dim ension of w hat hun ters do has been lim ited to the 
actual capture of prey (see Laughlin 19 6 8 , A ltm an 19 8 7 ), 
it is still ra ther infrequent for researchers to  explore the 
direct connection betw een these tw o decision sets.
Second, Hawkes, w hile working squarely w ith in  the 
fram ework of socioecology, successfully expands the 
overall perspective in  w hich resource sharing is gener­
ally cast by proponents of optim al foraging theory. In 
general, optim al foragers have taken the view that (1 j 
im m ediate sharing provides a hun ter w ith  insurance 
against a future tim e w hen less success m ay be enjoyed 
(variance reduction) and (a) sharing reduces the  uncer­
tain ty  inheren t in  the pursu it of scarce big game. 
Hawkes leans strongly toward a third, less frequently 
articulated view, nam ely, th a t sharing represents a form 
of tolerated theft through w hich harvest resources are 
projected from the realm  of private into th a t of public 
goods as individuals eschew short-term  consum ption re­
turns so th a t they m ay accum ulate social capital and, 
ultim ately, reproductive advantage.
This, however, appears to m e no t to represent the 
whole explanation for w hy hunters share and how re­
sources become public. A critical elem ent of wildlife 
harvesting is th a t i t  is an  activity  no t easily carried out 
w ith  great success by lone producers. Rather, m ost 
forms of large-game procurem ent require the coordi­
nated action of several individuals. Thus, harvesting be­
gins, in  term s of the tim e and energy investm ent re­
quired, as a shared activity  complex. Among Inu it of the 
Eastern Canadian Arctic, the hunting  of m ost forms of 
interesting game alm ost always involves the  coordi­
nated action of from tw o to  five or six harvesters. It 
would appear from  ethnological evidence tha t there is 
an aspect to northern  food sharing tha t recognizes the 
substantial energy and tim e contributions of all partici­
pants of a h u n t group to the success enjoyed by one or 
tw o members. In w in ter sea-ice sealing, for instance, 
each hun ter m akes a contribution to group success by, 
at the very least, denying the  use of a breathing hole 
to seals (Nelson 19 6 9 , W enzel 1 9 9 1 ), thus aiding in  the 
capture of a seal by an associated hun ter w aiting at an­
other station. T he fact th a t hunters A, B, and C do not 
capture seals w hile X and Z  succeed does no t negate the 
former's contribution to overall group success. In other 
words, there is no transform ation of "goods" from pri­
vate to public because harvesting is premised on col­
lective/ cooperative action. Indeed, virtually  all forms of 
Inuit pursuit of large anim als begin w ith  an acknowledg­
m ent of the w ide social contextualization of harvesting, 
and this contextualization or em beddedness has broad 
im plications for the substance of subsistence relations.
J O H N  E .  Y E L L E N
N ational Science Foundation, 1800  G St. N .W ., 
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In a study of faunal rem ains from abandoned IKung San 
camps (Yellen 19 8 6 ) I analyzed change in  m eat diet over
a 32 -year period w hich covered the  transition  from h u n t­
ing and gathering to  a m ixed strategy incorporating cat­
tle and goats as w ell as w ild  game. The data indicated 
th a t cattle, in  essence, directly replaced large ungulates 
and tha t goats likew ise came to  fill the  same niche and 
assum e the same relative im portance as hunted  anim als 
of about the  sam e size. A t the  tim e I found it difficult to 
understand w hy replacem ent rather than  addition took 
place, since young boys herd livestock and adult hunters 
still had the tim e to  m ain tain  traditional pursuits. Why 
not use th is opportunity  to add to  the am ount of m eat 
obtained? I concluded th a t th is pattern  was best under­
stood no t in  im m ediate subsistence term s and adopted 
the suggestion by Alison Brooks th a t "hunters in  the 
successful pursu it of large anim als benefit m ore from 
the long-term  reinforcem ent of social ties than  short­
term  nutritional re tu rns" (p. 7 7 4 ). D ata such as these 
support the  general approach w hich Hawkes adopts and 
suggest th a t it should be exam ined and developed in  a 
system atic way. The strength of H aw kes's paper lies in  
her presentation of a formal m odel w hich attem pts to 
interpret subsistence activities w ith in  a broader social 
and evolutionary context. The im plications for the  u n ­
derstanding of sexual division of labor are also sig­
nificant.
Hawkes clearly recognizes how  com plex the  world 
can be, and several IKung San examples serve to illus­
trate this. In m ost instances it  is a poisoned arrow fired 
by a single individual w hich results in  an anim al's 
death, and therefore it is th a t man, in  H aw kes's terms, 
who qualifies as the "successful hun ter."  However, th is 
obscures the extent to w hich large-game hunting is a 
com m unal effort. In the  Kalahari, for example, large ani­
m als are highly m obile and hard to  locate. The inform a­
tion about game m ovem ent derived from anim al tracks 
observed by unsuccessful hun ters and by w om an gather­
ers and then  shared across the  group can set the  stage 
for the one successful individual on the following day. 
Haw kes's model, as I understand it, assum es tha t the 
hun ter can rightly claim  tha t success derives 1 0 0 % from 
his own efforts, and one can question how  often in  real­
ity it holds.
A second issue involves delayed reciprocity. How does 
one know th a t a hun ter does no t give m eat away today 
w ith  the expectation th a t it w ill be returned at some 
future date w hen the ethnographer is no longer there to 
record it? Hawkes is clearly aware of th is problem  and 
uses both data-oriented and theoretical approaches to 
deal w ith  it. There is one caution, however, w hich 
m ight be noted: H unting ability varies over the  course 
of an individual lifetim e, increasing w ith  experience and 
then  tailing off as physical strength  and eyesight decline. 
!Kung know, for example, th a t old m en are no t good 
hunters, and one m ight wonder if younger m en are not 
in  effect banking against old age. In such a hypothetical 
case, reciprocity is long delayed, and the  question is dif­
ficult to  exam ine directly.
Hawkes presents the hunter-gatherer world in  term s 
of a dichotomy: there is food and the nu trition  it  pro­
vides, and then  there is essentially everything else,
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lumped together as "social attention ." This strikes me 
as an appropriate first step, since models, by definition, 
simplify reality and simple formulations precede more 
complex ones. What happens, however, if one recognizes 
that among the !Kung good trance dancers are rare and 
that the medicine that passes from their hands is also a 
good which can be conceptualized in  the same way as 
meat from a large game animal? I would ask—as a ques­
tion, rather than a criticism —w hat happens to a "pub­
lic-goods approach" when a num ber of public goods and 
multiple actors w ith differential control over them  may 
be involved. Is the entire approach undermined, or can 
refinements deal w ith the issue?
Finally, it is w orth considering the hunting/social- 
attention model in a broader ecological context as 
Hawkes agrees one should. Where m eat is hard to come 
by, the model m ight apply, but w hat happens as this 
resource becomes successively easier to obtain? Does 
this approach fall apart, or do other public goods (or com­
binations of them) come to the fore? It m ight be interest­
ing to see w hat would happen if one attem pted to apply 
this basic view of hum an behavior to a pastoralist group.
Reply
K R I S T E N  H A W K E S
Salt Lake City, Utah, U .SA . 26 iv 93
Grinker makes the m ost general objections to m y argu­
ment: (1 ) that it uses functionalist logic, (2 ) that it treats 
contemporary hunter-gatherers as analogs for the distant 
past, and (3 ) that it isolates groups from their regional 
temporal and social contexts. These are im portant be­
cause they m ark a boundary of understanding between 
theoretical orientations. (Can those from one under­
stand "the other"?) Behavioral ecologists try to explain 
why organisms do one thing rather than another by ex­
amining the fitness-related costs and benefits of feasi­
ble alternatives. Features of interest are explained in 
terms of their adaptive "function," that is, their effects 
on the survival and reproduction (more generally, inclu­
sive fitness) of the individuals displaying them  because 
natural selection designs features by way of these ef­
fects. In social and cultural anthropology "functional­
ism " (pace Malinowski) sought to explain social pat­
terns by their effects on the survival or reproduction of 
a metaphorical superorganism. Various devastating 
problems w ith  group-level functionalism  have been rec­
ognized not only by evolutionary biologists, critical of 
the explanation of patterns by their effects on group or 
species survival (e.g., Williams 19 6 6 ), but also by social 
scientists (e.g., Elster 19 89 ), who nevertheless seek to 
explain social outcomes as the result of individuals' 
making "functional" choices, that is, preferring alterna­
tives that better serve their own goals.
As to the use of m odem  foragers as analogs for the 
distant past, it is a central evolutionary proposition that 
contemporary organisms have been designed by their
evolutionary history: we are the richest source of evi­
dence about our evolutionary past. At the same time, 
every moment, every event differs from every other and 
is itself as m ultiple as its participants. Probably neither 
of these propositions is actually in dispute. The question 
is how we proceed in light of them. Patterns (let alone 
their recognition) are possible only if some of the vari­
ables and some of the values they take m ake more differ­
ence than others. W hat we disagree about is which vari­
ables are likely to m ake the m ost difference. On the 
basis of his Efe experience, Grinker suspects that rela­
tionships w ith  neighboring ethnic groups play a more 
im portant role in  resource choice and patterns of sharing 
in the ethnographic cases I cite than characteristics of 
the available wild food resources. That is an empirical 
question. The descriptive records of !Kung-speakers in 
the Dobe area in the sixties, of the Ache around Chupa 
Pou in the early eighties, and of the Hadza in Tli'ika 
from the mideighties to the present show that local re­
source characteristics have systemic effects on foraging 
strategies. This is not a general argument against the 
importance of other variables. If complex social arrange­
m ents can be explained as the outcome of individuals' 
m utually adjusting their own behavior according to 
their available options, then the character and value of 
those options continually m atter. Changing dangers of 
attack from enemies, changing alternatives to trade 
with, m ate with, or work for neighbors m ight have im ­
portant effects on the choices people make. Posing and 
testing contrary hypotheses about these effects could be 
illum inating (see, e.g., Blurton Jones, Hawkes, and 
O 'Connell n.d.).
Grinker and especially Peterson are critical of the 
readiness w ith  which evolutionary ecologists focus on a 
small num ber of ecological and behavioral dimensions 
at a time. Again, this focus does not arise from an as­
sumption that only  these variables matter. Instead, the 
proposition is that something can be learned from how 
they m atter in  the case at hand that adds to our under­
standing of how they m atter generally. Variables ex­
pected to be im portant on theoretical grounds and m ea­
surable across cases are more attractive candidates for 
study. I am  ripping subjects out of their regional con­
texts. W hether or not that is useful turns on the ques­
tions of interest and on the empirical patterns showing 
how the variables under study are related.
The strong appeal of variance-reduction explanations 
for sharing is impressive. I reiterate the central (and par­
adoxically not so contentious) point that no m atter how 
great the "group benefits," they are rarely enough for 
self-interested actors to provide a collective good. Har- 
pending rates it an embarrassm ent to sociobiology that 
hunting does not maximize energy acquisition for "the 
group, the family, or the individual," but sociobiologists 
should expect conflicts of interest w ithin groups, with 
"inefficiencies" a common result. Smith notes that 
many have shown how iterated games produce different 
solutions than one-shot prisoner's dilemmas. True, but 
stim ulated by Axelrod's influential argument to the con­
trary, they have also shown that an evolutionarily stable 
pattern of reciprocity is not often one of them. The
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m odel Sm ith cites (Smith and Boyd 19 9 0 ) is an illustra­
tion. He explored the  circum stances in  w hich neigh­
boring groups m ay do better to allow access to each 
other's foraging territory. According to  the model, they 
do better to  allow  the  use of their territory only when 
the costs of defending it  outweigh the benefits of keep­
ing others out. T he relatively im m ediate costs of not 
sharing (tolerated theft instead of reciprocity) determ ine 
w hether allowing access is the dom inant strategy.
As Beckerman says, " th e  literature bursts w ith  ac­
counts of the w eight of reciprocity in  egalitarian societ­
ies." The label is ubiquitous, bu t i t  is used in  ethnology 
for patterns in  w hich quid pro quo is explicitly denied 
and the obligations of the social relationship are said to 
govern instead. I cited the classic ethnological review 
(Sahlins 19 6 5 ; 1 9 7 2 : chap. 5 ) enum erating examples in 
w hich transfers are n o t literally  reciprocal and m ore re ­
cent argum ents consistent w ith  th is (Ingold, Riches, and 
Woodburn 1988 , Bird-David 19 9 0 ). Peterson's com m ent 
that in  A ustralia one of the reasons young m en h u n t is 
to pay back the old m en who nurtured  them  in "long- 
delayed reciprocity" is an example of com m on usage. 
This pattern does no t involve repeated exchanges w ith  
each party 's current costs com pensated by delayed bene­
fits returned. A n old m an cannot w ithhold his previous 
nurturing "next tim e"  if a young m an does no t give. As 
Peterson notes, young m en m ay have other things to 
gain from old m en, bu t tha t is a different argument. 
Notions of debt and repaym ent shape m any of m y own 
actions and seem  to shape those of others I observe both 
in  the "field" and out. Surely reciprocity m ust fit some 
of it, but there is a great deal th a t i t  does not fit. The 
delays are too long, the flows too consistently  one-way, 
the punishm ent for cheaters too m ild or absent alto­
gether. If som ething besides k in  effects and reciprocity 
makes a big difference in  patterns of social behavior in 
small-scale com m unities dependent on wild food, the 
same thing may, as Yellen says, be im portant in  other 
social settings.
I picked the three cases because of biases in  m y own 
experience b u t m ight easily have added the G unwinngu 
because of A ltm an 's rich ethnography. His case descrip­
tions and quantitative data (Altman 19 8 7 , A ltm an and 
Peterson 19 8 8 ) show (1 ) the  w ider sharing of larger, more 
unpredictably acquired resources, (2 ) the im portance of 
current inequities over re turns for past favors in  the dis­
tribution of shares, and (3 ) persistent biases in  the con­
tribution of these w idely shared resources. M y argum ent 
is tha t the first tw o patterns m ake large, unpredictably 
acquired resources like public goods and th a t the third 
pattern  im plies th a t som ething other than  shares re­
turned (and so reduced variance in  their own consum p­
tion) m ust m otivate suppliers. A ltm an and Peterson 
both note tha t sharing does reduce risk, so I repeat that 
m y argum ent is n o t  tha t sharing fails to reduce con­
sum ption variance bu t tha t such an outcom e is insuffi­
cient to explain w hy people do it. People fail to supply 
all kinds of collective goods. Yet in  each of these cases 
m en spend substantial am ounts of tim e trying to acquire 
resources w hich will be consum ed by others.
My presentation has led Jeske to  surm ise incorrectly
that only a few m en hun t. Am ong the Ache and !Kung 
(Hawkes et al. 19 8 5 ) m ore successful hunters spend 
m ore tim e hun ting  (we have no t yet done the analysis 
for the Hadza), bu t m en who are less successful spend 
tim e hun ting  as well. Yellen's observation about the 
com plexities of assigning credit w hen m any are in ­
volved and W enzel's point about cooperative sealing 
should be underlined, bu t big-game hun ting  is often no t 
cooperative (Yellen 1 9 7 7 : appendix B; Lee 19 7 9 : chap. 
8). Hadza m en usually  h u n t alone.
As Jeske says, more data are needed. I agree w ith  Pe­
terson tha t data on the reproductive success of !Kung 
hunters w ould be of great interest. Publication of the 
records Harpending m entions w ould be m ost welcome. 
A variety of questions could, however, be asked. In some 
discussions of evolutionary approaches, the use of vari­
ables o ther than  an actual count of descendants in  a 
future generation is described as an  unfortunate neces­
sity. Proxy variables for fitness are seen as poor but inev­
itable substitu tes because " the  real th ing" cannot ac tu ­
ally be m easured in  the present. But m ost of the tim e it 
is the current trade-offs th a t are of central interest. If 
m ore successful hunters do have m ore grandchildren, 
that w ill no t tell us h o w  successful hun ting  and n u m ­
bers of grandchildren are linked. If they do no t have 
grandchildren, then  sam ple size (and so o ther character­
istics of those particular m en or th a t particular tim e 
slice), o ther unm easured fitness com ponents (such as 
sisters' grandchildren), or m ixed strategies (in which, for 
example, poor big-game hunters spend m ore tim e ac­
quiring private goods and so gain comparable fitness pay­
offs) could all be im plicated. The assum ption  tha t ind i­
viduals have been designed by their evolutionary history 
to act in  their own fitness in terest is a powerful one. 
Given it, the question is no t w hether bu t h o w  individu­
als can be serving their probable fitness better by doing 
w hat they do ra ther than  things they  could do instead. 
Modeling can clarify requirem ents im plicit in  our favor­
ite guesses and also specify hypotheses about the con­
straints and trade-offs th a t w e need to  find ways to test.
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